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Former Jurors as Retrial Consultants: A Proposed
Model Rule for the "Worrisome But Clevere'
Practice of Post-Mistrial JurorInterviews
Susanna E. Cowen

Like all other Californians with jury duty, the panel of jurors
who heard Gregory Haidl's rape trial each received the statutorily mandated fifteen dollars per day as compensation for their
civic service.' Once the jury hung-that is, failed to reach a
unanimous verdict-the criminal justice system ceased to limit
the value of these jurors' thoughts and time. In preparation for
his client's retrial, Haidl's lawyer, Joseph Cavallo, hired members of the first jury as consultants. He paid each of them a five
hundred dollar retainer and fifty dollars per hour to be available
before and during the trial.2
Cavallo's retainer fee and hourly reward is significantly
more lucrative than the California court system's fifteen dollar
per day reimbursement scheme. Critics of Cavallo's retrial
preparation strategy fear that the explicit connection he draws
between jury service and profit invites jurors to resist reaching a
unanimous verdict, in the hopes that such resistance will result
in financial gain.' An attorney's use of former jurors raises more
* George Gombossy, Ex-JurorRetainedas 7TwalConsultant,Natl L J 3 (Dec 30, 1985
/ Jan 6, 1986) (quoting the assessment of Robert M. Axelrod, former chairman of the
Connecticut Bar Association's criminal justice division, with respect to another Connecticut lawyer's decision to hire a juror from a hung jury as a consultant in his client's retrial
as "worrisome but clever").
B.A. 2001, Columbia University; J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Chicago.
Under California law, a juror in superior court receives fifteen dollars per day for
each day's attendance as a juror after the first day, unless she is a public employee who
receives regular compensation and benefits while performing jury service. Cal Civ Proc
Code § 215(a)-(b) (West 2004).
2 Diane Curtis, PaJngJurors: Savvy trial strategy--orattack on the jury system,

Cal Bar J (Jan 2005), available at <http.//calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbarscbj.jsp?s
CategoryPath--/Home/Attorney%20Resources/California%20Bar%2OJournaI/January2 0 05
&sCatHtmlPath=cbj/2005-01 THOtlPaying-jurors.html&sCatHtmTitle=Top%20
Headlines> (last visited Apr 23, 2005).
3 See Claire Luna, From Jury Box to Defense Table; Legal Ethicists Raise Concerns
About Plan to Use Jurorsin OC Rape Trialas Consultants,LA Times B1 (July 18, 2004)
(discussing the concerns that legal ethicists have with attorneys using former jurors as
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than this ethical concern; it also invites questions about its constitutionality and systemic consequences. This Comment explores these questions and concerns and finds that current regimes regulating post-trial attorney-juror contact do not adequately police the use of former jurors as retrial consultants.
As Part I explains in detail, all states but one address posttrial contact between attorneys and jurors generally, either
through local court rules,4 rules of professional conduct,' legislation,' or caselaw.7 Two general models exist for regulating posttrial communication: (1) those that allow attorneys to contact
former jurors only after obtaining court approval,' and (2) those
that allow attorneys to contact former jurors as long as the contact does not harass or embarrass jurors, or influence their actions in future jury service These regulations primarily respond
paid consultants).
4 See App 1, Survey of District Court Rules Governing Post-Trial Communication
between Attorneys and Jurors (listing, by federal district, court rules that pertain to posttrial attorney-juror contact). See, for example, D Ky Ct Rule 47.1 (current as of Mar 2004)
("Unless permitted by the Court, no party or attorney-or the representative of a party or
attorney-may contact, interview, or communicate with a juror on any matter relating to
the trial before, during, or after trial.").
5 See App 2, Survey of State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct Governing Post-Trial
Communication between Attorneys and Jurors (listing, by state, rules of professional
conduct that pertain to post-trial attorney-juror contact). See, for example, Del Prof Conduct Rule 3.5(c) (Michie 2003) ("A lawyer shall not ... communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury unless the communication is permitted by court
rule.").
6 See, for example, Cal Code § 206(b) (West 2005) ("Following the discharge of the
jury in a criminal case, the defendant, or his or her attorney or representative, or the
prosecutor, or his or her representative, may discuss the jury deliberation or verdict with
a member of the jury, provided that the juror consents to the discussion and that the
discussion takes place at a reasonable time and place.").
7 See, for example, United States vKepreos, 759 F2d 961, 967 (lst Cir 1985) (declara
ing prospective rule that "henceforth this Circuit prohibits the post-verdict interview of
jurors by counsel, litigants or their agents except under the supervision of the district
court, and then only in such extraordinary situations as are deemed appropriate").
8 See, for example, Cuevas v UnitedStates, 317 F3d 751, 753 (7th Cir 2003) (approving the idea that, local rules aside, attorneys should obtain the trial judge's permission
before beginning post-verdict interviews of jurors); S D Ga Ct Rule 83.8 (current as of
Mar 2004) ("No party, attorney, or other person shall, without Court approval, make or
attempt any communication relating to any feature of the trial of any case with any regular or alternate juror who has served in such case, whether or not the case was concluded
by verdict."); Mass Prof Conduct Rule 3.5(d) (2004) ("A lawyer shall not . . . after discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which the lawyer was connected, initiate any communication with a member of the jury without leave of court
granted for good cause shown.").
9 See, for example, State v Webb, 1997 Tenn Crim App LEXIS 188, *36 (finding that
the trial court may not prohibit post-trial contact between jurors and defense counsel, as
long as counsel follows both court evidentiary rules and court rules that require him to
refrain from "asking questions or making comments that tend to harass or embarrass the
juror or to influence actions of the juror in future cases") (citation omitted), revd in irrele-
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to post-trial scenarios such as attorney investigations of potential
juror misconduct' and attorney harassment of jurors." Indeed,
most states lack a specific response to a new and increasingly
justice systems: the former jupopular feature of their criminal
12
ror turned retrial consultant.
Part II argues that most rules regarding post-trial communication with jurors cannot meaningfully regulate the use of former jurors as retrial consultants. These insufficient models aim
to protect two legal rights: the defendant's right to not have an
improper verdict entered against him 3 and the juror's right to
privacy.' 4 In the context of a mistrial, the former right is irrelevant and the latter is only of slight concern. Existing rules ignore
the more important interests at stake in a second trial: (1) the
defendant's interest in a fair retrial, (2) the juror's interest in
choosing whether to aid retrial preparation, and (3) the lawyer's
interest in communicating with jurors to improve her retrial
strategy. Existing rules regulating post-trial attorney-juror contact safeguard legal interests of little or no consequence in a mistrial's wake and police the use of jurors as retrial consultants
imperfectly, if at all.

vant part, 2000 Tenn Crim App LEXIS 202; N D Ill Ct Rule 83.53.5(d) (current as of Mar
2004) ("After discharge of the jury... the lawyer shall not.., ask questions of or make
comments to a member of the venire that are calculated to harass or embarrass the juror
or to influence such juror's actions in future jury service."); Cal Prof Conduct Rule 5320(D) (West 2005) ("After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case a
member shall not ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury that are
intended to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence the juror's actions in future jury
service.").
10 See, for example, Brassell v Brethauer,305 S2d 217, 220 (Fla App 1974) (finding
that the purpose of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct's regulation of post-verdict
interviews with former jurors is to preserve the right to interview jurors only where facts
indicate a faulty verdict).
l1 See, for example, Rapp v DisciplinaryBoard of the Hawaii Supreme Court,916 F
Supp 1525, 1536 (D Haw 1996) (recognizing two compelling state interests that can justify a rule regulating attorney-juror contact: "the public policy holding jury deliberations
and verdicts inviolable and the aim of protecting the privacy ofjurors").
12 Consider Curtis, PayingJurors,Cal Bar J (cited in note 3) (detailing how Cavallo's
ability to use former jurors as retrial consultants only hinges on whether there is "a father willing to write a check" for the service); Leonard Post, Hiring FormerJurors as
Trial Consultants Catches On: Some Cry Foul,' Others Callit Good Strategy, Natl L J 6
(Aug 16, 2004) (discussing the phenomenon of jurors as retrial consultants).
13 See UnitedStates v Moten, 582 F2d 654, 664 (2d Cir 1978) ("[T]he defendant has a
right to a trial by an impartial jury.").
14 See Haeberle v Texas InternationalAlrlines, 739 F2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir 1984)
("The first-amendment interests of both the disgruntled litigant and its counsel in interviewing jurors in order to satisfy their curiosity and improve their advocacy are ... outweighed by the jurors' interest in privacy .... "). See also Rapp, 916 F Supp at 1536.
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Part II goes on to examine the ethical and systemic inadequacies of existing post-trial communication rules. These rules
protect institutional concerns like maintaining the finality of
jury verdicts" and encouraging the free flow of ideas in the jury
room. 6 Such concerns are central when attorneys seek to impeach a verdict, but peripheral or irrelevant when attorneys prepare for retrial. Existing rules also fail to address the tension
between possible incentives for jurors to prevent a unanimous
verdict and the need to improve attorney efficacy. Jurors who
know that they will be paid for post-trial consultation might purposefully throw the trial, but they can also help the lawyers become more effective. Any rule not tailored to address this paradox will be an ineffective regulatory device.
Part III, accordingly, proposes just such a rule. This proposed rule of criminal procedure, which applies only in the aftermath of a mistrial, both expands and limits the current role
that judges play in monitoring post-trial attorney-juror communication. It also caps the amount of money that a former juror
may receive as a consultant, thereby allowing lawyers to compensate former jurors for their time, without giving them a financial incentive to ignore the merits of a case in order to hang
the jury. The rule balances the needs of the defendant, the victim, and the juror in a way that current state rules and laws fail
to do.
I. THE LAW OF POST-MISTRIAL ATTORNEY-JUROR
COMMUNICATION

Currently, with the exception of Connecticut, states only indirectly regulate the use of jurors as paid retrial consultants.
State regulations of post-mistrial communication between jurors
and attorneys fall into two general categories: (1) those policing
the communication through broad provisions that monitor post-

15 See Jorgensen v York Ice Machinery Corp, 160 F2d 432, 435 (2d Cir 1947) ("[I]t
would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute perfection that no verdict shall
stand, unless every juror has been entirely without bias, and has based his vote only upon
evidence he has heard in court. It is doubtful whether more than one in a hundred verdicts would stand such a test; and although absolute justice may require as much, the
impossibility of achieving it has induced judges to take a middle course, for they have
recognized that the institution could not otherwise survive.").
16 See McDonald v Pless, 238 US 264, 267-68 (1915) (finding that juror testimony
may not be used to impeach the verdict the jury arrived at because to allow otherwise
would result in a public harm, "the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion
and conference").
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trial contact between attorneys and jurors, 7 and (2) those expressly prohibiting juror compensation for communication with
attorneys. 8 While the latter of these two categories assumes the
rigid form of a ban, the former group of regulations breaks down
into two flexible variants: (1) those requiring court approval before post-trial attorney-juror contact may take place, and (2)
those allowing for attorney-juror contact as long as it does not
hassle the jurors or influence their conduct in future jury service.
A.

General Regulations on Post-Trial Attorney-Juror Contact

Jurisdictions that do not expressly address an attorney's use
of former jurors as paid retrial consultants regulate attorneyjuror communication generally through local court rules, 9 rules
of professional conduct,2" and rules developed in court decisions.2 '
These general provisions divide into two strains: (1) those allowing for post-trial contact only with the court's permission; and (2)
those allowing for this contact as long as it does not harass or
embarrass the jurors, or influence their actions in future jury
service.
1. Requirement of the court's permission.
Many courts, local federal district court rules,
professional conduct require the court that heard
case to approve any post-trial contact between a
party to the case.22 The First Circuit addressed this

and rules of
the original
juror and a
requirement

17 See, for example, United States v Kanahele, 951 F Supp 928, 943 (D Haw 1996)

(affirming a lower court's denial of defendant's request for post-mistrial interviews by
drawing on a Hawaii Rule of Professional Conduct that forbids ex parte communication
between parties post-trial).
18 See, for example, Prohibition on Former Juror Serving as Consultant, Conn Gen
Stat Ann § 51-247b (West 2004) ("No person who serves as a juror in the trial of an action
shall, for consideration, advise or consult with any party with respect to a subsequent
retrial of such action or a separate trial arising out of the same transaction or offense
involving the same or different parties. Any person who violates the provisions of this
section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.").
19 See, for example, State v Harris,859 A2d 364, 430-32 (NJ 2004) (upholding the
denial of defendant's request for post-verdict juror interviews because his request did not
meet the high bar of the "good cause" requirement of the court rule governing post-verdict
juror interrogations).
20 See, for example, United States v Driscol, 276 F Supp 333, 340 (S D NY 1967)
(refusing to recommend disciplinary sanctions for an attorney who interviewed former
jurors post-trial based on the opinions of the New York Committee on Professional Ethics).
21 See note 7.
22 See note 8.
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in the context of post-mistrial contact in United States v Kepreos.23 Here, the court opined that the government may have an
"unfair advantage" over the defendant when, in anticipation of
jury selection for retrial, it interviews jurors from the original
panel without the defendant's knowledge.2 4 Ultimately, the First
Circuit found that this post-trial contact did not harm the defendant because it neither caused prejudicial evidence to be admitted at trial nor exculpatory evidence to be suppressed there.25
However, the court declared that, in the future, post-trial interviews could proceed only under the district court's supervision, in
"such extraordinary situations as are deemed appropriate."2 6
Most court standards are as vague as the First Circuit's "extraordinary circumstances" test. While some courts require that
attorneys show "good cause" before granting parties the right to
approach, interview, or communicate with former jury members 27 others make no such demand. 2 The differences in the text
23 759 F2d 961 (1st Cir 1985).
24 See id at 967 (noting defense counsel's request for dismissal on the grounds that
she would be unable to overcome the "unfair advantage" the government gained in the
jury-selection process and the first three days of trial).
25 Id at 968.
26 Id at 967. The court based this prophylactic rule on its unwillingness to tolerate
the consequences of the unbridled interviewing of jurors. Kepreos, 759 F2d at 967. It
found that such unchecked interviewing of jurors "could easily lead to their harassment,
to the exploitation of their thought processes, and to diminished confidence in jury verdicts, as well as to unbalanced trial results depending unduly on the relative resources of
parties." Id.
27 Jurisdictions in Arizona, the District of Columbia, and Indiana are among those
whose district court rules include this "good cause" requirement. See D Ariz Civ Ct Rule
39.2(b) (current as of Mar 2004) ("Approval for the interview of jurors in accordance with
the interrogatories and affidavit [that the district court rules require] will be granted only
upon the showing of good cause."); D DC Ct Rule 24.2(b) (current as of Mar 2004) ("If no
request to speak with jurors is made before discharge of the jury, no party or attorney
shall speak with a juror concerning the case except when permitted by the Court for good
cause shown in writing."); S D Ind Ct Rule 47.2 (current as of Mar 2004) ("In all criminal
cases, any petition for leave of Court to [approach, interview or communicate with any
juror after trial] shall require showing of good cause.").
28 District court rules in Colorado, Georgia, and Kansas provide examples of rules
that require court approval of attorney requests for post-trial interviews without designating how attorneys should support these requests. See D Colo Civ Ct Rule 47.1 (current
as of Mar 2004) ("No party or attorney shall communicate with ... a juror or prospective
juror before, during, or after any trial without written authority signed by the judicial
officer to whom the case is assigned for trial."); S D Ga Ct Rule 83.8 (current as of Mar
2004) ("No... attorney ...shall, without Court approval, make or attempt any communication relating to any feature of the trial of any case with any regular or alternate juror
who has served in such case, whether or not the case was concluded by verdict."); D Kan
Ct Rule 47.1(b) (current as of Mar 2004) ("Under no circumstances except by order of the
court in its discretion, and under such terms and conditions as it shall establish, shall
any party or any party's attorney or their agents or employees examine or interview any
juror.").
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of these court rules, however, may have little practical effect. In
the absence of an explicit "good cause" requirement in their
rules, courts usually impose their own such requirement when
deciding whether to grant requests for juror interviews.2 9
The limited scope of this explicit or implicit "good cause" requirement can prevent these rules from adequately policing attorneys' requests to consult with former jurors after a mistrial.
Typically, the "good cause" requirement involves evidence of juror misconduct.30 Attorneys use post-trial interviews to impeach
the verdict against their clients.3 1 Courts, though, do not tolerate
pure "fishing expedition[s]" for such misconduct.3 2 Consequently,
some evidence of wrongdoing must exist before the court will
grant an interview. The "good cause" requirement of most current regimes thus demands some evidence of a need for the interviews based on a juror's past conduct.3" This requirement
seems unsuited for monitoring requests for post-mistrial interviews, where attorneys are primarily concerned with shaping the
outcome of a retrial.
The court rules for the Western District of Tennessee affirm
the presence of this mismatch between the "good cause" requirement and post-mistrial interviews. The rule that applies to posttrial attorney-juror contact provides, in pertinent part, "In the
event that a mistrial is ordered due to the jurors' inability to
agree on a verdict, any attorney or the attorney's representative
may interrogate a juror without prior approval of the court,
unless the court determines that appropriate limitations should
be established."3 5 The rule allows for contact that does not have
29 See, for example, United States v Moten, 582 F2d 654, 666 (2d Cir 1978) (finding
that when there has been a showing that an investigation is warranted, it is improper for
the court to bar all interviewing, including that which takes place under court supervision); UnitedStates v Wilburn, 549 F2d 734, 739 (10th Cir 1977) (finding that when an
attorney's assertion of jury misconduct is unsubstantiated, the lower court properly denied his motion to interview former jurors); United States v Sanchez, 380 F Supp 1260,
1265-66 (N D Tex 1973) (finding that, where good cause appears, the court allows attorneys to interrogate jurors).
30 See, for example, Moten, 582 F2d at 667 (holding that when a defendant demonstrates the jury's access to extraneous prejudicial information or other improper influence
on jury proceedings that warrants an investigation, post-verdict interviews of jurors are
necessary).
31 Id.
32 Id.

33 See id.
34 But see E D Wis Ct Rule 47.3 (current as of Mar 2004) ("Good cause includes a
trial attorney's request for permission to contact one or more jurors after trial for the trial
attorney's educational benefit.").
35 W D Tenn Ct Rule 47. 1(b)(2) (current as of Mar 2004).
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to be asked for, but may be restricted. In doing so, it recognizes
that in the event of a mistrial, the circumstances of the case may
justify an attorney's access to former jurors. This access is presumptively harmless.
Likewise, the unsuitability of the "good cause" requirement
to requests for post-mistrial contact with jurors is evident in
cases where attorneys seek leave of court to engage in this contact. For instance, in United States v C & C Dairy, Inc,3 6 the
Northern District of Illinois granted the government's request for
post-mistrial interviews with jurors even though the government's request did not rise from a traditional "good cause"
source.3 7 The government sought the interviews to aid in its decision whether or not to retry the defendants.3" The court consented on the grounds that the interviews would positively impact the government's retrial preparation.3 9 The court's rationale
in this example highlights the difference between post-mistrial
interviews with jurors and post-trial attorney-juror contact in
general. Unlike more routine requests for post-verdict interviews, the juror interviews that the government requested in C &
C Dairy were "not being sought either in an effort to impeach a
verdict or to satisfy lawyers' curiosity or to create a specter in
jurors' minds of their being interrogated in connection with any
future jury service."4" Instead, access was sought to improve the
government's retrial performance.4 '
Under the Northern District of Illinois's reasoning, the
unique insight former jurors can provide into the original trial
performance might meet the "extraordinary situation" requirement of the First Circuit.42 Under this logic, any "good cause"
requirement for granting post-mistrial interviews is superfluous:
former jurors can always provide a unique insight into a trial in
which they took part. Its presence only confuses courts as to
what an attorney must show to receive approval to conduct these
interviews. In this way, such a requirement unnecessarily limits
an attorney's access to jurors after a mistrial.

1991 US Dist LEXIS 6238 (N D Ill).
See id at *4 (noting that the government's request for post-mistrial juror interviews to aid in its decision to retry the case "isnot at all a 'routine' situation").
36
37

38

Id.

39 Id.
40 C& C Dairy,1991 US Dist LEXIS at *4.
41

Id at *2.

42

See id at *4 (noting the unique nature of the government's request).

4851
2.

POST-MISTRIAL JUROR INTER VIEWS

493

Post-trial contact cannot distress jurors.

The declaration of a mistrial creates powerful incentives for
lawyers to seek information from the jurors post-trial because of
the time and effort that attorneys put into trying their cases. In
the first noted instance of a defense lawyer paying a former juror
to act as a consultant in a retrial, Connecticut attorney Michael
Sherman's post-trial contact with former juror Lisa Lord occurred when he ran into her at a pizzeria. 4 ' Lord's explanation
for why she was working as Sherman's consultant was simply,
"[h]e asked me to do it and I did it."' Whether Sherman planned
his run-in with Lord remains the subject of debate." Former jurors like Lord may not know that they have a right not to speak
to an attorney post-trial. While some state laws and district court
rules require that the court alert jurors to this fact, others recognize this right without any specific requirement that the court
notify jurors of it.46 The possibility that Sherman intentionally
tracked down Lord to interview her combined with Lord's seemingly uncritical acquiescence raise concerns that, left to their
own devices, lawyers might violate the rights of unsuspecting
former jurors.
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct forbid lawyers from engaging in any post-trial communication with jurors in a way that might coerce or harass them.4 7
State codes of professional conduct often elaborate upon this requirement. For instance, in Iowa, post-trial communication between a lawyer and a juror is permissible "so long as the lawyer
refrains from asking questions or making comments that tend to
harass or embarrass the juror or to influence the actions of the
juror in future cases."' These rules recognize that an attorney's
43 Gombossy, Ex-JurorRetained as Trial Consultant, Natl L J at 3 (cited in note *).

44 Id.
45 See JurorsForHire, Wash Post A12 (Jan 6, 1986).
46 Compare Ca Code Civ Proc § 206(a) (2004) ("Prior to discharging the jury from the
case, the judge in a criminal action shall inform the jurors that they have an absolute
right to discuss or not discuss the deliberation or verdict with any one."); D DC Crim Ct
Rule 24.2 (current as of Mar 2004) ("After a verdict is rendered or a mistrial is declared
but before the jury is discharged, an attorney or party may request leave of Court to
speak with members of the jury after their discharge. Upon receiving such a request, the
Court shall inform the jury that no juror is required to speak to anyone but that juror
may do so if the juror wishes."), with D Ariz Ct Rule 1.11(c) (current as of Mar 2004)
("Except in response to a Court order, no juror is compelled to communicate with anyone
concerning any trial in which the juror has been a participant.") and D Mont Ct Rule
48.2(c) (current as of Mar 2004) (same).
47 ABA Model Rule Prof Conduct 3.5(c)(3) (2004).
48 Iowa Prof Conduct Rule 7-29 (2003). See also Ala Prof Conduct Rule 3.10 (2004)
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post-trial interaction with jurors should be proscribed even in the
absence of court supervision.
These rules revolve around the broad category of post-trial
communication between attorneys and jurors, but they are inefficient means of monitoring the specific problem of post-mistrial
juror consultation. They target instances where the jury verdict
frustrates an attorney to the extent that he feels justified in behaving unprofessionally toward members of this jury.4 9 An attorney seeking consultation may be eager and aggressive when pursuing the help of former jurors to improve his retrial strategy. He
is more likely, though, to flatter these former jurors into helping
him than to berate them for their inability to reach a verdict. The
threat remains that an attorney might employ intense and unwanted practices when obtaining a former juror's consent to consult. Yet because such practices run counter to the attorney's
interest in attaining retrial assistance, rules protecting jurors
from harassment or embarrassment may not meaningfully regulate post-mistrial attorney-juror consultation.
B.

Former Jurors May Not Act as Paid Retrial Consultants

Connecticut is the only state that flatly prohibits a former
juror from serving as a paid consultant with respect to a retrial
of the action that he originally heard.50 A violation of this statute
results in a misdemeanor conviction for the former juror.51 While
the law does not target the attorney who hired this former juror,
were a lawyer to pay a juror to be a retrial consultant, he would
likely face professional misconduct charges or, more critically, be
liable for aiding and abetting a misdemeanor, which itself is a
misdemeanor in Connecticut. 2

("After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which the lawyer
was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make comments to a member of
that jury that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence the
juror's actions in future jury service.").
49 See, for example, In re Berning, 468 NE2d 843, 845 (Ind 1984) (finding that an
attorney violates the Indiana Code of Professional Responsibility when he sends a letter
to former jurors out of frustration with an adverse verdict and this letter harshly criticizes the jurors' decision, thereby causing them to feel harassed, irritated, angry, displeased, and embarrassed); State v Chesne, 734 A2d 1131, 1140 (Me 1999) (noting that
when the lawyer of a convicted murderer contacts a juror who enabled his conviction, the
contact "may be an event of particular stress and fear").
50 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 51-247b.
51 Id.
52 Post, HiringFormerJurors,Natl L J at 6 (cited in note 12).
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The Connecticut legislature enacted this prohibition in 1985,
in response to what it felt was an affront to the jury system. 3
That year, after the jury in his client's rape case failed to reach a
unanimous verdict, Michael Sherman, a Connecticut lawyer,
hired one of the former jurors as a retrial consultant.5 4 This consultation provided the lawyer with information about the first
jury's reaction to witnesses, arguments, and evidence.5 5 Although
the second jury also convicted the defendant, the Connecticut
legislature enacted this law to prevent money, rather than justice, from motivating jurors in the future.56
Currently, the California legislature is considering whether
to enact legislation similar to Connecticut's. 7 As in Connecticut,
53 Id.
54 Id.
5 Luna, From JuryBox to Defense Table, LA Times at B1 (cited in note 3).
56

Id.
Act to Add Section 206.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure, Relating to Jurors, Bill
252, Cal State Senate, 2004-05 Sess (Feb 15, 2005), available at <http'/www.leginfo
.ca.gov/pub/billlsenlsb_0251-0300/sb 252_bill_20050215_introduced.pdf> (last visited Apr
23, 2005).
At present, California law protects the rights of jurors to not discuss their deliberations or verdicts. Ca Code Civ Proc § 206 (2004). The law provides:
67

(a) Prior to discharging the jury from the case, the judge in a criminal action shall
inform the jurors that they have an absolute right to discuss or not to discuss the
deliberation or verdict with anyone. The judge shall also inform the jurors of the
provisions set forth in subdivisions (b), (d), and (e).
(b) Following the discharge of the jury in a criminal case, the defendant, or his or
her attorney or representative, or the prosecutor, or his or her representative, may
discuss the jury deliberation or verdict with a member of the jury, provided that the
juror consents to the discussion and that the discussion takes place at a reasonable
time and place.
(c) If a discussion of the jury deliberation or verdict with a member of the jury pursuant to subdivision (b) occurs at any time more than 24 hours after the verdict,
prior to discussing the jury deliberation or verdict with a member of a jury pursuant
to subdivision (b), the defendant or his or her attorney or representative, or the
prosecutor or his or her representative, shall inform the juror of the identity of the
case, the party in that case which the person represents, the subject of the interview, the absolute right of the juror to discuss or not discuss the deliberations or
verdict in the case with the person, and the juror's right to review and have a copy
of any declaration filed with the court.
(d) Any unreasonable contact with a juror by the defendant, or his or her attorney or
representative, or by the prosecutor, or his or her representative, without the juror's
consent shall be immediately reported to the trial judge.
(e) Any violation of this section shall be considered a violation of a lawful court order
and shall be subject to reasonable monetary sanctions in accordance with Section
177.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(g) Pursuant to Section 237, a defendant or defendant's counsel may, following the
recording of a jury's verdict in a criminal proceeding, petition the court for access to
personal juror identifying information within the court's records necessary for the
defendant to communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion for
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the impetus for the drafting of California's legislation was an
attorney's desire to compensate former jurors for aiding his retrial preparation." Once the attorney, Joseph Cavallo, announced that he would employ former jurors as consultants in
his client Gregory Haidl's retrial, the Orange County District
Attorney suggested that the legislature enact a law to forbid
such a practice.59 Two California state legislators subsequently
introduced a bill to amend California's Penal Code to embody the
District Attorney's suggestion.6" After the legislature failed to
enact this bill during its 2003-2004 session," State Senator Acnew trial or any other lawful purpose. This information consists of jurors' names,

addresses, and telephone numbers. The court shall consider all requests for personal juror identifying information pursuant to Section 237.
Id.
58 A report issued to the California Senate Committee on Public Safety noted that the
"bill is based on a case in Orange County where after a hung jury the defense attorney
hired former jurors as consultants on the retrial of the case." Analysis of Bill 252, Cal
Senate Committee on Public Safety, Cal State Senate, 2004-05 Sess (Mar 29, 2005) at A,
D, available at <http'//www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb_0251-0300/sb252_cfa_2005
0325 112038_sencomm.html>, (last visited Apr 24, 2005).
59 Rachanee Srisavasdi, DA Opposes Paying Ex-Jurors to Consult, Orange County
Register 1 (July 20, 2004).
60 Id.
This is not the first time that the California legislature has considered a law to ban
attorneys from paying jurors for post-mistrial consultation. In 2004, two California state
legislators introduced a bill to amend California's Penal Code to embody the District
Attorney's suggestion.
The proposed 2004 amendment to the California law would have created a new
crime of unlawful juror conduct. Act to Amend Section 116.5 of, and to Add Section 116.6
To, the Penal Code, Relating to Jurors, Assembly Bill 473, Cal State Assembly, 2003-04
Sess (Aug 4, 2004), available at <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-O4/bill/asm/ab04510500/ab 473_bill 20040804_amendedsen.pdf> (last visited Apr 24, 2005). In pertinent
part, the proposed § 116.5(b) deemed a person:
[G]uilty of unlawful juror conduct when, at any time following the discharge of the
jury in a criminal proceeding, he or she does any of the following: (1) As a former juror in a proceeding or acting on behalf of a former juror in that proceeding, accepts
or agrees to accept any payment or benefit for himself or herself or for the former juror in consideration for the former juror's consultation or any other services rendered to a party to that proceeding concerning any aspect of the subject matter at
issue in the trial in which the former juror served, or concerning a retrial of the
case;(2) confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any payment or benefit upon a former
juror in that proceeding, or upon a third person who is acting on behalf of a former
juror in that proceeding, in consideration for the former juror or third person supplying consultation or any other services as specified in paragraph (1) to a party to
that proceeding; [or] (3) Enters into an agreement between a former juror and a
party to the proceeding that would preclude the former juror from discussing the
case in which the juror served with any other party to that proceeding, or any agent
of another party to the proceeding.
Id.
61

Curtis, PayingJurors,Cal Bar J (cited in note 2).
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kerman introduced a truncated version of the measure to the
California State Senate.
Senator Ackerman's proposed amendment to the California
law would create a new crime of unlawful juror conduct. The bill
proscribes, without time limitations, two possible scenarios involving former jurors as retrial consultants.63 First, in reference
to the exchange of compensation for information regarding any
aspect of the trial in which a former juror served, the proposed
statute forbids: (1) former jurors from accepting a benefit for
their consultation service, and (2) individuals from conferring or
offering to confer a benefit upon former jurors for consultation in
anticipation of retrial.64 This proposed statute covers both
Cavallo and the former juror to whom he paid a consultant fee.65
As a result, it casts a wider net than the Connecticut regime,
which limits responsibility for the consultant relationship to the
former juror. 6
The current debate surrounding the bill focuses on how the
proposed law affects the dynamic between defense attorneys and
prosecutors at retrial.67 Senator Ackerman contends that, as long
as the legislature continues to allow attorneys to pay former jurors for their thoughts, it "promotes a two-tiered judicial system
that grants wealthy defendants alternatives not available to
poorer defendants."68 He views the proposed law as a way to close
"a loophole in the law that gives lawyers for wealthy defendants
62 Bill 252, Cal State Senate (Feb 15, 2005). Unlike the bill before the legislature in
the 2003-2004 term, the bill currently under consideration does not address the issue of
whether an attorney and former juror may enter into an agreement that forbids the juror
from discussing her impressions of the case she heard with any other party to the case.
Id.
63 Id.

64 The text of the proposed bill is as follows:
(a) After conclusion of any civil or criminal proceeding that was tried by a jury, both
of the following shall apply: (1) No party to the proceeding or person acting on behalf of that party shall make any payment of money or give anything of value to any
person who served as a juror in that proceeding in connection with that person's
service as a juror. (2) No person who served as a juror in that proceeding shall accept any payment or anything of value in connection with that person's service as a
juror from any party to the proceeding or a person acting on behalf of that party.
Id.
65 Bill 252, Cal State Senate (Feb 15, 2005).

66 Corn Gen Stat Ann § 51-247b.
67 See Analysis of Bill 252, Cal State Senate at D (Mar 29, 2005) (detailing the arguments the California Senate Committee on Public Safety deems relevant in its consideration of the bill).
68 Id at E.
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a distinct advantage over prosecutors in a retrial."69 Ackerman
thus believes that his law will lessen two imbalances in the
criminal justice system: that between the rich and the poor and
that between defense lawyer and prosecutor. Thus, his justification for the law is rooted in an inequality in the criminal justice
system that exists despite a case's merits.
Those who oppose Ackerman's measure do so on the ground
that they believe the proposed law increases an imbalance in the
justice system, rather than diminishes one. There is concern with
the bill's criminalization of all post-trial interaction between
former jurors and attorneys. 70 In particular, as the bill encompasses a broad range of "payments," it equates an attorney buying jurors "a cup of coffee while they sit and chat" with an attorney paying former jurors a fifty dollars per hour consultation
fee. 7' Additionally, the California Senate Committee evaluating
the bill notes that criminalizing all payment to jurors enhances
the inherent advantage of the prosecution in criminal cases.72
This initial advantage stems from the prosecution's having "the
full power of the state behind [it] including the decision whether
or not to retry a hung jury."73 For this reason, "by criminalizing
all payment to the jurors, an additional advantage is given to the
prosecutor in that it will be the prosecutor who can decide
whether or not to charge an attorney with a misdemeanor for a
'payment to the juror."'7 4 Likewise, the bill's opponents reason
that contrary to Ackerman's contention, the bill does not increase
the disparity in the representation of the wealthy and the poor:
In the existing system, even a defendant who can afford a
private attorney for the first trial may not be able to do so
if there is a hung jury and the jury is retried. This puts
the advantage with the prosecutor who uses public dollars
and can decide to do so even if the
in deciding to retry
7
verdict was 1-11.

69

Id.

70

Id at H.

71 Analysis of Bill 252, Cal State Senate (Mar 29, 2005) at H, E.
72

Id at E.

73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Analysis of Bill 252, Cal State Senate (Mar 29, 2005) at H-G.
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As these comments reveal, every unfair advantage that Ackerman finds in the absence of a ban on former jurors serving as
paid retrial consultants, his opposition finds in its presence.
It remains to be seen how the California legislature will balance these competing views of whether the bill diminishes or enhances the inequities of the criminal justice system. Perhaps the
legislature might not even reach the point in their consideration
of the bill where such balancing is necessary. Given that the jury
convicted Haidl at retrial,7 6 the legislature may lose its concern
with the potential advantages that the possibility of paid juror
consultants affords."
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF POST-MISTRIAL CONTACT BETWEEN
JURORS AND ATTORNEYS

General regulations of post-trial attorney-juror contact often
emphasize the protection of interests that are not in jeopardy in
the post-mistrial juror-consultant context. Although they differ
in structure, regulations that require court approval for posttrial contact and those that merely proscribe the harassment of
jurors balance the same constitutionally protected interests: the
defendant's right to a fair trial78 and the juror's right to privacy.79
These regulations seek to guard the integrity of the jury system
by favoring the finality of verdicts and protecting jurors from
harassment. ° An exploration of the constitutional, ethical, and
systemic implications of post-mistrial juror consultation reveals
76 Clare Luna, Victim Calls Sex Tril an Ordeal; On TV Jane Doe' recounts the
courtroom drama in the 0. C. assault case and says she almost couldn't testify, LA Times
B3 (Mar 30, 2005) (remarking on the guilty verdict the jury rendered in Haidl's retrial).
77 Cavallo believes this legislation is "just politics." Curtis, Paying Jurors,Cal Bar J
(Jan 2005) (cited in note 2). He noted that other lawyers would follow his lead if they only
"had the guts" to withstand the criticism he has faced, which includes being called "slimy"
and "unethical." Id.
78 See US Const Amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.").
79 See US Const Amend V ("No person shall... be deprived of... liberty... without
due process of law."). The Supreme Court has found that the Fifth Amendment's conception of personal liberty, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
gives rise to the privacy interest an individual has "in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters." Whalen vRoe, 429 US 589, 589-99 (1977).
80 See Cuevas v United States, 317 F3d 751, 753 (7th Cir 2003) (finding that the
purpose of court rules regulating post-trial communication between attorneys and jurors
includes increasing the finality of jury verdicts and protecting jurors from harassment);
Rapp v DisciplinaryBoard of Hawaii Supreme Court, 916 F Supp 1525, 1536 (D Haw
1996) (finding that the purpose of rules of professional conduct that regulate post-trial
communication between attorneys and jurors includes maintaining the inviolability of
jury verdicts and guarding against a systemic dismantling of juror privacy).
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how these existing regulations protect interests that are either
peripheral or irrelevant to retrial consultation. This exploration
also shows that the failure of current regimes to effectively regulate juror consultation comes both from a misplaced emphasis on
some interests and from a neglect of others.
A.

Constitutional Implications
1.

Defendants' right to a fair and impartial jury.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
right to a trial by an impartial jury.8 This guarantee of impartiality preserves an individual's liberty in the face of criminal
prosecution by insisting that a juror's verdict rise only from the
evidence developed at trial.82 The impartiality requirement
therefore indicates that criminal convictions should not depend
upon a juror's financial and social concerns."
The use of former jurors as retrial consultants creates financial and social incentives that may jeopardize a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights. First, the possibility of paid post-trial consultation may skew a juror's decision-making process.8 4 The potential financial benefit from consultation services may create perverse incentives for an individual to prevent the jury from reaching a unanimous verdict, regardless of the weight of the evidence
before her. This is especially true in heavily publicized cases
like Haid's, where the stakes are high and defense counsel's re81 US Const Amend VI.
82

Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 723 (1961) ("To hold that the mere existence of any

preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient
to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an
impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion
and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.").
83 See Getter v Wal-Mart Stores, 66 F3d 1119, 1122 (10th Cir 1995) (permitting peremptory challenges for cause where jurors have a direct financial interest in the trial's
outcome because such an interest invites the presumption of bias); Nancy S. Marder,
Deliberationsand Disclosures:A Study of Post-Verdict Interviews of Jurors,82 Iowa L
Rev 465, 469 (1997) (noting that if jurors base their votes on how they think the community will respond when the information becomes available through post-verdict interviews, their impartiality during trial is questionable).
84 See Curtis, Paying Jurors, Cal Bar J (cited in note 2) (noting the belief of many
legal scholars that if lawyers pay former jurors for their consultation, the potential for
such payment may alter how jurors decide cases); Luna, From Jury Box to Defense Table,
LA Times at B1 (cited in note 3) (same).
85 Kevin Drew, Should FormerJurorsBe Paidto Advise in a Retrial?; ExpertsDebate
Ethics of Defense Lawyer's Strategy in Gang-Rape Case, CNN.com (Aug 10, 2004), available at <httpJ/www.cnn.com/2004LAW/08/06/jurors.consultants> (last visited Apr 24,
2005).
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sources are seemingly unlimited. In such cases, commentators
speculate that as jurors come to expect pecuniary rewards for
their post-trial services, a "bidding war" will ensue between defense lawyers and government prosecutors. 86 As these bidding
wars cause consultant fees to swell, the chance that a juror's financial interests will strip a defendant of his Sixth Amendment
rights grows too. Because existing laws and court rules place no
caps on these fees, the steady increase of these fees and the perverse incentives that they create could eventually erode a defendant's right to a fair retrial.
Second, the promise of retrial consultation could also limit
the jury's impartiality due to a juror's desire for notoriety. Specifically, in high profile cases where post-mistrial consultation
might link a former juror to a celebrity-defendant," a juror who
covets such status might intentionally cause a mistrial. On the
other hand, a shy juror might fear the possibility of post-mistrial
contact with an attorney and may vote in favor of a judgment she
does not believe in, simply to prevent an attorney from seeking
out her retrial advice. Although both of these scenarios may be
unlikely given the foresight, planning, and disregard for the law
that they entail, the possibility still exists that the anticipation
of post-verdict interviews will inform a juror's pre-verdict behavior.88 Voir dire might provide a mechanism for eliminating conflicted jurors from the jury pool. Yet, this mechanism's ultimate
effectiveness is questionable given that both prosecutors and de86 Srisavasdi, DA Opposes PayingEx-Jurors to Consult,Orange County Register at 1
(cited in note 59).
87 See Bennett H. Beach, The Juror as Celebrity; Does Postverdict Press Scrutiny
Prevent Abuses or Create Them?, Time 42 (Aug 16, 1982) (detailing the advice a prosecutor gave to the jurors being impaneled to hear the case of John Hinckley that, once the
trial began, they would "become celebrities of a sort").
88 Joshua Okun explains how the anticipation of any post-trial contact with an attorney taints jury deliberation in Investigationof Jurorsby Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process,56 Georgetown L J 839, 860 (1968). Okun reasons that:
[T]he attorney's inquiry into the juror's motives and actions is made after the conclusion of the trial does not eliminate the possibility that anticipation of this questioning may have affected the juror's thinking while he was still in the jury room.
The very fact that he may be called upon to account for or explain his view may consciously or subconsciously cause him to modify his position in the jury room. Perhaps it will not change his vote, but it may well affect the vigor with which he maintains his position, thus affecting the vote of fellow jurors. We should also consider
the case of the juror who knows he is under no obligation to talk with anyone following the trial, and who in fact either refuses to respond to inquires or is not even approached. This juror's deliberations may still be influenced by the knowledge that
other jurors may reveal his jury-room position to the inquiring party.
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fense attorneys have a stake in preserving the ability to glean
useful information from former jurors. Thus, as long as rules policing post-trial attorney-juror contact focus on protecting the
rights of jurors, the threat to a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right remains unchecked.
Post-mistrial contact between an attorney and a former juror
may strip a defendant of his right to a fair retrial even when juror awareness of its possibility does not affect deliberation. For
instance, when contact occurs between a prosecutor and a former
juror at the close of a trial without the defendant's knowledge,
the attorney's behavior, rather than the juror's, may constitute a
Sixth Amendment violation. 9 In response to this situation, the
First Circuit declared a prophylactic rule to govern future requests for post-trial interviews with former jurors.9" An attorney
may proceed with the interview only under the district court's
supervision, in "such extraordinary situations as are deemed appropriate."9 ' Despite announcing this rule, the First Circuit
found that the defendant in the case before it suffered no actual
harm when the government contacted the former jurors.9 2 Its
declaration of this rule, in the face of an outcome that appears to
deem the rule unnecessary, suggests that the mere possibility of
a Sixth Amendment violation is enough to warrant a restrictive
rule regarding post-trial access to former jurors. Yet, because the
court does not provide guidance for what constitutes an "extraordinary situation," its rule may be too restrictive to promote the
Sixth Amendment rights that it purports to protect.
The First Circuit's rule may constrain post-mistrial behavior
too strictly because an attorney's access to former jurors can increase the fairness of the defendant's retrial by increasing lawyer
efficacy.9 3 Interviews with jurors regarding their impressions of
the evidence introduced and witnesses examined during trial can
improve lawyers' trial skills and courtroom performances.94 Post'9 Kepreos, 759 F2d at 967.
90 Id.
9' Id.
92 Id at 767-68.

93 Pamela M. Smoljanovich, Post-TrialInterviews with Jurors:An Absence of Regulation in West Virginia, 95 W Va L Rev 1121, 1136 (1993) ("[I]nformation obtained
through post-trial interviews may help lawyers improve their advocacy skills in future
trials or strengthen a particular case on retrial.").
94 Karlene S. Dunn, When Can an Attorney Ask: 'What Were You Thinking?Regulation of Attorney Post-TrialCommunication with JurorsAfter Commission of Lawyer Discipline v Benton, 40 Tex L Rev 1069, 1079-80 (1999) (arguing that because posttrial attorney-juror interviews improves the skills of lawyers, Texas should modify its
vague disciplinary rule that prevents this contact in certain situations).
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mistrial interviews with former jurors can teach lawyers how to
represent their clients better in the future and how to convince
the second jury to accept their positions.9 5 As long as compensation for consultation with former jurors is limited and courts
monitor the effect of this consultation on both jurors and defendants alike, former jurors who serve as retrial consultants may,
on balance, positively impact a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights.
2.

Jurors' right to privacy.

Regulations of post-trial conversations between jurors and
lawyers can implicate a juror's right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty.9 6 The Supreme
Court's approach to juror privacy rights evinces a concern that
the news media are more likely than lawyers to violate these
rights, especially during voir dire. Regardless, because courts
98
possess the inherent power to protect jurors' privacy, this privacy right must inform any court sanctioned procedure, whether
it applies to the media or to lawyers.99
The current rules monitoring general post-trial attorneyjuror contact already address this concern. When a court considers whether to allow a post-trial interview, the protection of juror
privacy serves as a compelling interest against allowing the interview. 0 0 This consideration extends to the context of requests
95 Id.

96 Consider Jones v Superior Court ofSan Diego County, 26 Cal App 4th 1202, 1210
(1994) (affirming a lower court decision that the release of the addresses or telephone
numbers of eight former jurors who had previously informed the court that they did not
want to fill out a post-verdict questionnaire would invade juror privacy rights, but declining to address the constitutional issue); Pantos v City and County ofSan Francisco, 151
Cal App 3d 258, 265 (1984) (denying a commercial jury investigation firm access to questionnaires that potential jurors filled out on the ground that, in this informational age,
dissemination of the questionnaire answers threatens to unreasonably intrude on the
juror's privacy).
97 See David S. Willis, JurorPrivacy: The Compromise Between JudicialDiscretion
and the FirstAmendment, 37 Suffolk U L Rev 1195 (2003) (noting that a concern "that
the press might discover and publish incriminating information about a juror's past during voir dire hearings" drives the Supreme Court's approach to juror privacy rights).
98 See Townsel v Superior Court of Madera County, 979 P2d 963, 967 (Cal 1999)
(detailing the court's inherent power to protect jurors).
99 See id at 964 (noting that the court must act as a "gatekeeper to ensure that any
juror contact by . . . counsel . . . is both consensual and reasonable"). See also United
States v Miller, 284 F Supp 220, 227 (D Conn 1968) (observing that even after the court
discharges the jury, it remains responsible for protecting the jurors from inquiry into
their deliberations).
1o See Rapp, 916 F Supp at 1536 (recognizing that the aim of protecting juror privacy
is one of the compelling state interests that can justify a rule regulating attorney-juror
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for post-mistrial interviews, where an attorney may invite a juror who agreed to consult with him to disclose the opinions of one
who did not.1" 1 Most of the rules that currently regulate postmistrial contact have no mechanism in place to inform a juror of
her post-trial privacy rights, or to remind her of the privacy
rights of the other members of her jury panel. The absence of this
safeguard renders these rules ineffective protections against the
invasion of jurors' post-mistrial privacy rights.
3.

Jurors' right to free speech.

Rules regulating post-mistrial interviews with jurors also
implicate jurors' First Amendment rights because these rules
constrain the jurors' ability to share their opinions with attorneys preparing for retrial. The First Amendment guarantees that
the government cannot abridge an individual's right to speak
and express herself freely.'0 2 Thus any statute, court rule, or
court order limiting the ability of former jurors to converse with
parties to the action they heard imposes on this constitutional
right." 3 Not all governmental intrusions on free speech are forbidden,0 4 however, although only a compelling state interest will
justify a court's imposition of prior restraints on jurors' freedom
of speech.' 05
Whether such a compelling interest exists in the context of
former juror speech remains unsettled. The Tenth Circuit found
that a court order banning an attorney from contacting jurors
after trial did not implicate the First Amendment rights of the
jurors because they remained free to approach the court with any

contact).
101 See Okun, 56 Georgetown L J at 860 (cited in note 88) (considering "the case of the
juror who knows that he is under no obligation to talk with anyone following the trial,
and who in fact either refuses to respond to inquiries or is not even approached. This
juror's deliberations may still be influenced by the knowledge that other jurors may reveal his jury-room position to the inquiring party.").
102 US Const Amend I.
103 But see Marder, 82 Iowa L Rev at 522-23 (cited in note 83) (arguing that restraints on the post-verdict speech of individual jurors may actually strengthen the
speech rights of the jury as a whole: "The jury speaks through its verdict, and its voice
may become less clear when individual jurors are able to add their own individual glosses
to the jury's pronouncement.").
104 See Times Fim Corp v City of Chicago, 365 US 43, 47 (1961) ('It has never been
held that liberty of speech is absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all previous restraints on speech are invalid.").
105 See JournWal PublshingCo vMechem, 801 F2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir 1986) (striking
down a judicial order prohibiting press contact with jurors because it was overbroad).
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of their concerns. °6 Courts have yet to address situations in
which such an alternative outlet for speech may be inadequate.
When a juror is only able to convey her thoughts on the trial to
to aid an attorney in his retrial preparathe court, her freedom
10 7
tion is constrained.
Restrictions on jurors' post-mistrial speech may promote another compelling government interest: the protection of its citizens' right to privacy.' While courts do not commonly employ
this technique, a narrowly tailored restriction on a former juror's
speech could limit the invasion of juror privacy rights, while simultaneously protecting juror speech.10 9 For instance, in the context of post-trial interviews between jurors and the press, a flat
ban on these interviews is an overbroad means of promoting juror privacy because "jurors very rarely disclose personal or private matters regarding other panelists.""0 If a court limits jurors'
post-mistrial speech in a manner that precludes them from disclosing especially personal, embarrassing, or otherwise inappropriate information gleaned from their deliberations, it protects
both juror privacy and speech rights.11 '
4.

Attorneys' right to free speech.

Just as a ban on post-mistrial contact between jurors and attorneys might curtail a juror's First Amendment rights, such a
ban also might impair an attorney's right to free speech." 2 Lawyers play a key role in the criminal justice system, and as a consequence of their special access to information through discovery
and client communications, "the State may demand some adher106
107

United States v Wilburn, 549 F2d 734, 739 (10th Cir 1977).
See Smoljanovich, 95 W Va L Rev at 1140 (cited in note 93) (arguing that the con-

stitutional protections of jurors' speech should be afforded not only to jurors in highprofile cases who speak to the media, but also to jurors with the less profitable goal of
relaying their observations to attorneys after trial).
108 See, for example, Rapp, 916 F Supp at 1538 (recognizing that the aim of protecting
juror privacy is one of the compelling state interests that can justify a rule regulating
attorney-juror contact).
109 Nicole B. Casarez, Examining the Evidence: Post-Verdict Interviews and the Jury
System, 25 Hastings Commun & Enter L J 499, 582-83 (2003) (detailing how judicial
orders that generally forbid jurors from discussing their deliberations, such as that the
Fifth Circuit upheld in United States v Cleveland, 128 F3d 267 (1997), "restrict both the
arguably dangerous speech as well as innocuous expression that serves to educate the
public about the jury system").
110 Id at 583.
111Id.
112 See Dunn, 40 Tex L Rev at 1092-99 (cited in note 94) (examining an attorney's
constitutional right of free speech in the context of rules of professional conduct that limit
this speech with jurors post-trial).
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ence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as
well as their conduct."" Thus, even when a court recognizes an
attorney's speech right, it still may constrain this right within
limits."'
Courts have yet to define the limits of this constraint postmistrial, when a lawyer's retrial strategy might include communication with former jurors. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Haeberle v Texas InternationalAirlines,"5 regarding an attorney's
request for "leave to interview jurors in order to learn 'some lesson' about the basis of its adverse verdict,"1 6 is a useful example.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of this request
after balancing the interests at stake." 7 The court considered the
following countervailing concerns: the jurors' right to privacy, the
public's interest in well-administered justice, and the attorney's
First Amendment rights."' When the court weighed the last of
these concerns lightly, it reasoned that, unlike reporters who use
juror interviews to inform the public about judicial proceedings,
attorneys who seek post-trial interviews to "learn some lesson,"
serve no higher public good." 9 As post-trial attorney-juror interviews do not affect political behavior, their access to former jurors may be limited in a manner that a journalist's cannot be. 2 '
Like the lawyer in Haeberle, attorneys who want to use former
jurors as consultants seek to learn from these jurors. Limitations
on the ability to obtain jury consultation impact the ability of
lawyers to effectively structure their retrial strategy. Because
this goal is both highly specific and likely to effect the next jury's
ability to reach a just verdict, attorneys' First Amendment rights
may be more important than current rules account for.

113 Gentile v State Bar ofNevada, 501 US 1030, 1074 (1991) (Rehnquist concurring).
114 Id.

115 739 F2d 1019 (5th Cir 1984).
116 Id at 1020.
117Id at 1021-22.
118 Id.
119 Haebere,739 F2d at 1022.
120 Id ("Although [an attorney's interests in satisfying his curiosity and improving his
advocacy techniques] are not without first amendment significance, they are not 'paramount' like the public's right to receive information necessary for informed selfgovernment."). Under In re Express-News Corp, 695 F2d 807, 810 (5th Cir 1982), only a
rule "narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the administration of justice,"
may restrict the first amendment right of journalists to gather news from post-verdict
juror interviews. Id at 810.
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Perverse Incentives

The main ethical concern arising from consultations with jurors is the creation of perverse incentives for jurors to thwart a
unanimous verdict. The potential for post-mistrial consultation
may skew juror deliberation through: (1) its offer of payment for
the consultation service, and (2) its offer of a role for former jurors in shaping a retrial strategy.
The prospect of recovering a consultation fee in the aftermath of a mistrial may invite individual jurors to disregard the
evidence before them to prevent the jury from reaching a verdict,
thereby making themselves viable retrial consultants.12 ' While
paid juror-consultants are not yet part of mainstream retrial
preparation, 122 it seems that those defendants who can afford to
pay these consultants will do so, given the interest they have in
securing an acquittal at retrial. The Haidl case supports this
prediction. Cavallo deemed fifty dollars an hour a "reasonable
amount" to offer jurors for their consultation, 2 3 as part of a larger retrial strategy that depended upon "a nine-member legal
defense team, an army of private detectives, O.J. Simpson's jury
consultant and a public-relations manager." 24 The threat of a
hidden profit motive driving juror decisions is not limited to the
trials of wealthy defendants. Because jurors often are unaware of
defendants' and125prosecutors' resources, the outcome of all trials
are in jeopardy.
The harms of a financial incentive in this context extend beyond skewing trial outcomes to a coarsening of the humanity of
the jury trial. One of the jurors who heard Haidl's first rape case
noted this when he explained his choice not to serve as a retrial
consultant. He based his decision on a belief that the willingness
of former jurors to profit from the criminal justice system essen-

121 Drew, Should FormerJurorsBe Paid to Advise in a Retrial? CNN.com (cited in
note 85).
122 Luna, From JuryBox to Defense Table, LA Times at B1 (cited in note 3).
123 Post, HiringFormerJurors,Natl L J at 6 (cited in note 12).
124 R. Scott Moxley, Man of the Year, OC Weekly 10 (Dec 31, 2004).
125 See Srisavasdi, DA Opposes PayingEx-Jurors to Consult, Orange County Register
at 1 (cited in note 59) (detailing the Orange County DA's assessment that offering consultant fees to former jurors compromises the integrity of the jury system "because future
jurors would see a financial incentive to favor one of the parties"). But see Analysis of Bill
252, Cal State Senate (Mar 29, 2005) at G (arguing that jurors will not decide a case in a
specific way to get an economic advantage because there are too many uncertainties surrounding this economic advantage, including a lack of knowledge regarding the parties'
resources and "which juror an attorney would be interested in talking to").
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tially exploits the "unfortunate lives of other people."'26 The
money that former jurors receive in compensation for their consultation cannot escape the taint of someone else's misfortune,
whether it be that of a victim or a wrongfully accused defendant.
As the link between jury service and profit obscures the link between jury service and the administration of justice, bias and
exploitation threaten to overtake
a juror's understanding of the
1 27
merits of the case before her.
Some jury experts, however, believe that the possibility of
eventually receiving a consultation fee will not change the way
juries work. 128 In fact, as Vanderbilt University law professor
Nancy J. King notes, "Most jurors are deeply conscientious about
their duty and would be unlikely to throw a trial in the hopes of
milking more money out of their jury summons."'2 9 For this reason, the practice of hiring former jurors as trial consultants may
not cause a systemic ethical problem. 130 Yet, because it only takes
one juror to keep the jury from reaching a unanimous verdict, a
reliance on the general nature of jurors to avoid a system-wide
problem may be misplaced, especially in the context of offering
former jurors a retrial consultation fee.'
126

Srisavasdi, DA Opposes PayingEx-Jurorsto Consult,Orange County Register at 1

(cited in note 59).
127 See Curtis, Paying Jurors,Cal Bar J (cited in note 2) (detailing the belief of Deborah L. Rhode, a Stanford University law professor, that the use of former jurors as paid
consultants "commercializes the deliberative process" in ways that may not be "healthy"
because jurors should "be thinking about jury service, not selling their advice later");
Luna, From Jury Box to Defense Table, LA Times at B1 (cited in note 3) (detailing how a
professional jury consultant finds that "people will not be able to focus on doing justice"
when there is a possibility of economic gain from their jury service).
128 See Curtis, Paying Jurors,Cal Bar J (cited in note 2) (noting that Richard C. Wydick, legal ethicist and professor of law at the University of California at Davis, considers
it a "long shot" that juries would intentionally aim for a mistrial in order to eventually
obtain consultant fees); Luna, From Jury Box to Defense Table, LA Times at B1 (cited in
note 3) (noting that Nancy J. King, professor of law at Vanderbilt University, believes
that deals with former jurors are unlikely to change how juries function).
129 Luna, From JuryBox to Defense Table, LA Times at B1 (cited in note 3).
130 Id.
131 Post-mistrial juror consultation also invites bias into the jury room by triggering
human appetites for attention and appreciation. Performing one's jury service obligation
is often executed in anonymity and without thanks. A lawyer's reliance on a former juror's opinion, however, renders post-mistrial consultation a means for former jurors to
secure further recognition for the performance of their civic responsibility.
In a high profile trial, this consultation also may generate public attention, as it
did for the jurors who sat at Haid's first rape trial, evidence of which lies in the frequent
mention of these jurors and their opinions about retrial consultations in the articles covering Cavallo's decision to hire the former jurors as retrial consultants. See, for example,
Luna, From Jury Box to Defense Table, LA Times at B1 (cited in note 3); Post, Hiring
FormerJurors,Natl L J at 6 (cited in note 12); Srisavasdi, DA Opposes PayingEx-Jurors
to Consul1 Orange County Register at 1 (cited in note 59).
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Ultimately, the infusion of bias in the jury room might diminish the value of the post-mistrial juror consultation for attorneys in search of aid at retrial. Jurors who forsake their civic
duty to act as impartial fact-finders for money and fame convey
less meaningful information to lawyers at retrial as those who
failed to reach a unanimous verdict in earnest. Yet, because attorneys seek juror consultants to improve their performance at
retrial, even a former juror who manipulated the jury system to
become a consultant can provide advice on how the attorney may
state his case at retrial more persuasively. For this reason, jurors' responses to the perverse incentives that consultant work
creates likely will not decrease attorney demand for consultant
services.
C.

Systemic Implications

The implications of post-mistrial attorney-juror consultation
not
limited to cases that actually result in mistrial. Rather,
are
the use of former jurors as retrial consultants impacts the criminal justice system as a whole. Specifically, post-mistrial consultation informs the behavior of lawyers and jurors in general, not
only after and during trial, but before the trial even begins.
The systemic consequences of using former jurors as retrial
consultants are limited to one cost and one benefit: the cost of a
potential decrease in public commitment to jury service and the
benefit of a potential increase in attorney efficacy. In contrast,
general post-trial inquiries engender a catalog of "evil consequences: subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting juryroom
deliberation, burdening courts with meritless applications, increasing temptation for jury tampering and creating uncertainty
in jury verdicts."13 2 These fears of "evil consequences" are misplaced in the context of requests for post-mistrial communication, where attorneys seek the communication to improve their
retrial strategy, rather than to expose juror misconduct. Likewise, limits on post-trial communications with jurors may be
132 United States v lannieIlo, 866 F2d 540, 543 (2d Cir 1989) (citations omitted). See
also Daverse vHohn,198 F2d 934, 938-39 (3d Cir 1952) (disapproving of the practice of
post-verdict juror interviews on the ground that it discourages citizens from serving on
juries for fear of later inquiries into their thoughts); Rakes v UnitedStates, 169 F2d 739,
745-46 (4th Cir 1948) (finding that a court may hold an attorney who makes studied
inquires of former jurors as to what occurred during deliberations guilty of obstructing
the administration of justice); State v LaFera,199 A2d 630, 635-36 (NJ 1964) (finding
that an investigation that avoids interviewing former jurors directly, but involves contacting the jurors' relatives, friends, and associates, undermines the jury system because it
obstructs the free debate among jurors for fear of this debate becoming public).
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necessary when a verdict is rendered, lest judges constantly deconstruct and analyze past cases.133 When the jury cannot reach
a unanimous decision, however, there is nothing for a postmistrial interview to deconstruct. Again, the rules regarding
general post-trial contact between attorneys and jurors are an
ineffective means of regulating post-mistrial juror consultation
specifically.
Post-mistrial attorney-juror contact could also have a systemic impact on a citizen's commitment to fulfilling jury service
obligations. Given the financial hardship that jury service can
entail and the time commitment it requires, many Americans
already fail to appear for jury duty when summoned, 3 4 or attempt to get out of serving during the selection process. 135 Attorney access to jurors after the court discharges them from their
service may cause jurors to feel their civic service has extended
beyond the bounds of the courtroom, into their daily lives.
Because post-mistrial communication can be seen as prolonging jury service, it may decrease commitment to a civic duty
that many already deem inconvenient and unattractive. 136 One of
the jurors who refused Cavallo's offer to serve as his retrial consultant based his refusal on his interest in closure at the end of
the trial.'37 He described his experience as a juror as a "nightmare" and told a reporter, "I want to put these very unfortunate
set of circumstances behind me as soon as I can .... There were
no winners in that trial at all, just us losers-defense, prosecution, and us jurors who couldn't come to a conclusion." 3 8
The Hawaii District Court linked this impulse for closure to
larger systemic concerns in United States v Kanahee,3 9 a case
133 See Jorgensen v York Ice Machinery Corp, 160 F2d 432, 435 (2d Cir 1947) ("[Ilt
would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute perfection that no verdict shall
stand, unless every juror has been entirely without bias, and has based his vote only upon
evidence he has heard in court. It is doubtful whether more than one in a hundred verdicts would stand such a test.").
134 See Evan R. Seamone, A RefreshingJury Cola: Fulfilling the Duty to Compensate
JurorsAdequately, 5 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 289, 293 (2002) (noting that "as few as forty
percent of all summoned jurors.., respond to the court's summons").
131 See Mark A. Behrens and M. Kevin Underhill, A Call For Jury Patriotism: Why
the Jury System Must Be Improved for CaliforniansCalled to Serve, 40 Cal W L Rev 135,
148 (2003).
136 See Miller, 284 F Supp at 228 ("Leaving jurors at the mercy of investigators for
both sides to probe into their conduct would make the already difficult task of obtaining
competent citizens willing to serve as jurors well nigh impossible.").
137 Srisavasdi, DA OpposesPayingEx-Jurorsto Consult, Orange County Register at 1
(cited in note 59).
138 Id.
139 951 F Supp 928 (D Haw 1996).
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where defense counsel's request to interview former jurors after
a mistrial was denied. 14° The court reasoned that such interviews
would be particularly taxing to jurors who had already faced intense media attention and a FBI investigation.4 The court also
noted that increasing the burden of jury service through further
post-trial attention would make it more difficult to select a jury
for retrial.' Cavallo's success in securing nine former jurors as
retrial consultants 43 demonstrates that not all jurors view their
jury service as a nightmare they want to wake up from. Yet, both
the testimony of the former juror who declined Cavallo's request
and the Kahahele court's reasoning reveal that the use of former
jurors as retrial consultants may cause a decline, however slight,
in overall commitment to the jury system.
The benefit that post-mistrial juror-consultants offer to the
criminal justice system is an improvement in the efficacy of attorneys as advocates. Interviews with former jurors in the aftermath of a mistrial can educate lawyers as to how to better represent their clients in the future by revealing the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases.' 44 These interviews invite former jurors to offer their impressions of the evidence introduced and the
witnesses examined during trial, and they provide an opportunity for lawyers to know what to emphasize or underplay at retrial. 45 Cavallo affirmed this understanding of the value of juror
impressions in retrial preparation. Before the Haidl retrial began, Cavallo noted that "[the jurors'] input has been beyond expectations in terms of each phase of the trial." 46 In fact, he said,
one juror actually pointed out a piece of evidence that both his
defense team and the prosecution had missed. 147 As Cavallo
deemed this piece of evidence as "absolutely critical" to his de-

140 Id at 943.
141 Id.

Id.
143 Curtis, PayingJurors,Cal Bar J (cited in note 2).
144 Id (quoting Robert Hirschorn, an attorney turned full-time jury consultant, who
described post-mistrial interviews with former jurors as a critically important means of
learning about a trial performance's strengths and weaknesses and which kind of jurors
are open to a lawyer's trial strategy and which kind are not).
145 Dunn, 40 Tex L Rev at 1079-80 (cited in note 94).
146 Marty Graham, Flap Ensues Over Hiring Ex-Jurors, Christian Sci Monitor 17
142

(Mar 2, 2005).
147 Id.
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fense strategy,'4 8 his experience underscores how information
from former jurors may play a crucial role at retrial.'4 9
Although courts disagree as to whether attorney education
sufficiently justifies post-trial interviews, the focus of the debate
has been on whether such interviews positively impact an attorney's general advocacy skills, rather than his specific ability to
prosecute or defend a retrial. 5 ' Part of the resistance to allowing
attorneys to contact jurors for the purpose of education stems
from a fear that attorneys disguise simple curiosity about the
origin of adverse verdicts with the claim that they are contacting
jurors to educate themselves.' 5 ' Because this fear is unfounded in
the context of requests for post-mistrial interviews specifically,' 52
the concern that interviews in this situation debase the jury system through purposeless intrusions into the jury's thought processes is absent. On the contrary, post-mistrial interviews fortify
this system. As these interviews improve a lawyer's ability to
advocate for his client at retrial, they guard against both the
possibility of another mistrial and a post-trial challenge that the
verdict rose from a lawyer's inadequacy.

Id.
See John E. Kidd, Jury Thals and Mock Jury Trials, 321 PLI/Pat 137, 175 (1991)
(noting that post-trial interviews with jurors provide attorneys with valuable insight on
how to present future cases: "You may find that what you viewed as your concept of the
best evidence was confusing or that the person you thought was the best witness alienated the jury.").
Of course, neither Sherman nor Cavallo, the attorneys best known for hiring
former jurors as retrial consultants, prevailed. Post, HiringFormerJurors,Natl L J at 6
(cited in note 12) (noting the jury conviction in Sherman's case despite his use of a former
juror as a paid retrial consultant); Luna, Victim Cafls Sex Trial an Ordeal,LA Times at
B3 (cited in note 76) (remarking on the guilty verdict the second jury rendered in Haidl's
case). This may suggest that such a strategy does not necessarily increase a lawyer's
efficacy at retrial. Yet, because the practice of hiring former jurors is uncommon, any
presumption about such efficacy would be premature if it was only based off of these two
cases.
15o Compare United States v Narciso, 446 F Supp 252, 325 (E D Mich 1977) (finding
that a discussion between former jurors and prosecutors regarding the nature of the case
and the course of the jury's deliberations for the purpose of the prosecutors' self-education
did not require the court to set aside the jury's original verdict) and Irving vBullock, 549
P2d 1184, 1188 n 10 (Alaska 1976) (noting that post-verdict interviews are proper when a
lawyer requests them for educational purposes), with Sixberry vBuster,88 FRD 561, 562
(E D Pa 1980) (finding that a post-verdict interview with a juror would not further a
lawyer's interest in improving his capabilities as a trial attorney).
151 In re Delgado, 306 SE2d 591, 594 (SC 1983) ("Approaching jurors normally serves
no purpose other than to satisfy curiosity.").
152 C & C Dairy, Inc, 1991 US Dist LEXIS 6238 at *4 (granting the prosecution its
request to interview former jurors on the grounds that the government represents in good
faith that they are seriously considering the prosecution's future course and that the
requested interviews with jurors will help in this process).
148

149
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III. A PROPOSED MODEL RULE
As Part I demonstrated, the current rules regulating general
post-trial contact between attorneys and jurors are ill-equipped
to address post-mistrial contact. Part II established that requests
for post-mistrial interviews invite a unique set of constitutional,
ethical, and systemic concerns. Accordingly, states should adopt
a rule that regulates post-mistrial contact between attorneys and
former jurors to supplement existing rules that only police general post-trial contact.
The need for this rule is also evident when conflicts arise between local court rules, rules of professional conduct, and caselaw regarding requests for post-trial interviews.15 3 In such situations, courts must either privilege one regime over the other, or
introduce a new disciplinary rule.M To avoid this confusion and
to provide predictability in the court system, a rule should be
adopted that recognizes the particular interests at stake in the
post-mistrial scenario: (1) the interest of a defendant that both
his trial and retrial are fair, (2) the interest of a juror that her
privacy and right to speech remain intact, and (3) the interest of
each state in a trial system that is free from perverse incentives,
encourages civic involvement, and is effective in administering
justice.
This Comment proposes a model rule that meets these ends.
This rule would require, upon a court's declaration of a mistrial,
(1) that judges instruct jurors (i) of their post-trial right to communicate or refuse to communicate with attorneys and (ii) that
any communication between them and any party to the action
requires court approval, (2) that attorneys obtain express leave of
(i) the court and (ii) the juror before conducting a post-trial interview with this juror, (3) that the communication between former
jurors and attorneys is for the express purpose of retrial preparation, (4) that attorneys pay former jurors for this service no more
than the daily rate they received for jury duty, and (5) that punishment for any violation of this rule is left to the discretion of

153

See Commonwealth v Solis, 553 NE2d 938, 940-41 (Mass 1990) (privileging a

Massachusetts Code of Professional Responsibility rule that allows for the proper initiation of a conversation with a discharged juror without court approval over a prior Massachusetts Supreme Court decision to only allow' for post-trial interrogation of jurors upon
court approval).
154 Id at 941 (deciding whether to adopt a new disciplinary rule or to rely on prior case
law).
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the courts, but should be directed equally at jurors and attorneys.
A.

Proposed Jury Instruction
1.

Protection of juror privacy.

The first component of the proposed rule requires that, upon
the declaration of a mistrial, the judge instruct the jurors that
although their service is over, their privacy interest in their deliberation remains valid.1 5 To resolve any uncertainty about the
jurors' remaining obligations, the court will formally release the
jurors from its prior admonitions not to discuss the case with
press or counsel ex parte. These instructions will also stress to
the jurors that during any post-mistrial contact with parties to
the case, they must respect the privacy and feelings of their fellow jurors. This formal release and reminder to respect the privacy of others is the first safeguard this proposed rule provides
for juror rights. Because most jurors may be unaware of their
post-trial rights," 6 an explicit announcement places these jurors
on the same informational plane as the attorneys who seek their
advice.
2.

Protection of the jury system.

Another systemic benefit of this increase in juror knowledge
is the likely increase in the detection of attorney violations of
court orders banning post-trial interviews. An attorney's posttrial behavior towards jurors may be overtly aggressive, as in the
case of a Texas lawyer who mailed letters to the jurors who denied his client damages that called the jury's decision "cold and
unfair."'5 7 In such an instance, jurors will readily sense the impropriety of the attorney's actions and report them to the court.
However, when post-mistrial interaction between jurors and attorneys is more subtle, as in the case of the lawyer asking a for155 See Rapp v DisciplinaryBoard of the Hawaii Supreme Court, 916 F Supp 1525,
1538 (D Haw 1996) (recognizing that post-trial attorney-juror contact implicates the
privacy rights of jurors); UnitedStates v Miller, 284 F Supp 220, 227 (D Conn 1968) (noting that the court remains responsible for protecting jurors from inquiry into their deliberations, even after releasing them from their service).
156 See United States v Driscoll,276 F Supp 333, 334-35 (S D NY 1967) (detailing
post-trial conversations between counsel and former jurors, where counsel responded to
the former jurors' concern about whether they should talk to him by assuring them that
such post-trial interviews were routine).
157 Commission for LawyerDisciplinev Benton, 980 SW2d 425, 428 (Tex 1998).
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mer juror for her advice in a neighborhood pizzeria, 15 jurors may
be unsure if the law supports or shuns the attorney's actions. In
this type of situation, jurors will be less likely to alert the court
to an attorney's potentially illegal behavior in the absence of a
court instruction.
The proposed rule's additional requirement that the attorney
have the court's permission to approach former jurors will also
benefit jurors. For example, if the judge in United States v Driscoll'59 had informed the jury that a court order was necessary
before counsel could approach them, they might not have suffered extended illegal conversations with defense counsel. 6 °
While these instructions to respect privacy may extend a juror's civic responsibility beyond the courtroom, on balance, the
benefits of this extension outweigh its costs. These instructions
inform jurors of their rights, which not only enhances these
rights, but also makes jurors themselves another means of enforcement in policing attorney misconduct. Jurors in especially
gruesome or high-profile cases might want nothing more to do
with the case they heard after the trial has ended.' 6 ' The proposed rule explicitly informs jurors of their right to refuse to
communicate with counsel after trial, and in doing so assures
them that they need not fear future reminders of the case
through post-mistrial interviews.
B. Proposed Court and Juror Approval
As the proposed rule requires both court approval and juror
consent, it gives attorneys the opportunity to improve the presentation of their case for retrial, without undermining the integrity of the jury system or stripping jurors of their privacy
rights.'62 To obtain court approval under Section (3) of the pro158

See Gombossy, Ex-JurorRetainedas Trial Consultant,Natl L J at 3 (cited in note

*) (detailing a Connecticut lawyer's use of a former juror as a retrial consultant after

approaching her in a pizzeria).
159 276 F Supp 333 (S D NY 1967).
160 See id at 334-35 (detailing improper conversations that took place between a private investigator that defense counsel hired and former jurors).
161 Post, HiringFormerJurors,Natl L J at 6 (cited in note 12) (noting that often after
a trial, jurors "don't want to talk").
162 Karlene Dunn proposes a similar rule in an effort to save Rule 3.06 of the Texas
Rules of Disciplinary Procedure from being unconstitutionally vague. See Dunn, 40 Tex L
Rev at 1112 (cited in note 94). Dunn suggests that Texas replace its rule forbidding posttrial attorney-juror contact that is intended to harass or embarrass jurors or to influence
their action in future jury service with a rule that allows for the consent of the juror or
the trial court when "good cause" is shown. Id at 1073.
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posed rule, an attorney must demonstrate that his request to
interview former jurors rises from a good faith desire to inform
the future course of his representation.'6 3 The attorney could
demonstrate this by submitting an affidavit outlining the intention to improve his retrial strategy through the use of juror consultants. The affidavit might also include sample questions he
plans to pose to the former jurors.
Under the proposed rule, courts would have the discretion to
determine whether or not to grant attorneys leave to conduct
post-mistrial juror interviews. In the debate regarding whether
juror names should be kept confidential, one critic advocated a
system in which judges hold hearings to justify restrictions imposed upon the press or public."6 Such a system, which forces
judges to support their decisions with specific, on the record findings,"' would be useful in this context too. While a hearing requirement imposes administrative costs on the court system, the
interest of the defendant in a fair trial and retrial, and of the juror in her privacy may warrant this imposition.
Regardless of the procedure the court uses to determine
whether to allow the requested interviews, it should consider
how the interviews will impact the interests of the parties and
the jurors, as well as the integrity of the jury system as a whole.
Because post-verdict interviews can both positively and negatively impact the defendant's trial rights, the judge must specifically examine the nature of the case and the notoriety of the defendant before rendering his decision. For instance, in a high
publicity case, where jurors might manipulate the verdict to attain their own celebrity status, a judge might feel access to former jurors would harm a defendant more than it would help
him. "66
' In this instance, the judge could announce at the beginning of trial that upon the occasion of a mistrial, the court will
not grant any requests for juror interviews. While such a limitation on post-mistrial interviews may not curb all juror miscon163 See, for example, C & C Dairy,1991 US Dist LEXIS 6238 at *4 (allowing post-trial
interviews when attorneys request such interviews "in good faith" for reasons the court
deems appropriate).
164 Willis, 37 Suffolk U L Rev at 1214 (cited in note 97) ("By requiring judges to hold
hearings justifying restrictions imposed upon the press or the public, courts would avoid
summarily restricting the First Amendment, while also protecting juries from harassment.").
165 Id (advocating a standard using "factual, on-the-record findings").
166 See State v Neulander, 801 A2d 255, 272-73 (NJ 2002) (upholding an order pre-

venting the media from interviewing jurors after a mistrial on the ground that such interviews might provide the prosecution with an inappropriate advantage in a retrial).
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duct, it likely will decrease juror bias during deliberation, especially for those jurors who consider the personal costs and benefits of declaring a mistrial. Alternatively, where an attorney may
have a limited skill set and resources, the court might allow for
attorthe interviews, thereby increasing the likelihood that the
6
ney's retrial preparation will be thorough and effective.'1
The concern that post-trial consultations with jurors strip
the jurors of their privacy also falls away under the proposed
rule. Subsection (2)(ii) of the proposed rule requires that lawyers
obtain express consent from jurors before consulting them. Because the First Amendment grants a juror the right to speak or
remain silent as she pleases,'68 the court does not have the power
to override a juror's refusal to consent.'6 9 Despite the crucial role
that a juror consultation might play in an attorney's retrial
preparation, the court cannot strip her of her right to silence.
Furthermore, as the court noted in United States v Miller, 70 "A
juror ought not even be burdened with the necessity of insisting
that he does not wish to be interviewed." 7 ' While this rule may
leave defendants worse off than a system in which courts could
overrule juror refusal to participate in post-trial interviews, the
rule balances the interests and rights of all parties.
Under the proposed rule, the court will supervise the method
by which attorneys obtain juror consent. 72 In C & C Dairy,'7 ' the
167

Courts are reluctant to grant indigent defendants funds for hiring experts on con-

stitutional grounds. See Diana G. Ratcliff, Notes and Comments, Using Thyal Consultants: What PractitionersNeed to Know, 4 J Legal Advoc & Prac 32, 49 (2002), citing
Jackson v Anderson, 141 F Supp 2d 811 (N D Ohio 2001) ("Indigent defendants may be
provided funds for hiring experts, presumably including a trial consultant. Although the
results of such requests vary in reported case law, anecdotal accounts suggest that courts
occasionally grant these requests. Constitutionally, however, 'a defendant cannot expect
the state to provide him a most-sophisticated defense.'"). Indigent defendants cannot force
the state to expend its funds on improving an attorney's fundamental skills. See Moore v
Johnson, 225 F3d 495, 503 (5th Cir 2000). Consequently, it seems unlikely that courts
would grant defendants money for juror consultations. This might point to a rule banning
compensation for post-verdict interviews entirely to ensure equal rights for defendants of
different classes.
168 In re Express-News Corp, 695 F2d 807, 811 (5th Cir 1982) ("The jurors' freedom of
speech is also freedom not to speak.").
169 But see Neuiander, 801 A2d at 265 ("The general rule that we distill from the
[federal and state court cases concerning the right of media representatives to conduct
post-verdict juror interviews] is that post-verdict juror interviews generally are permitted
if the juror consents, but jurorsare not requiredto consent.") (emphasis added).
170 284 F Supp 220, 227 (D Conn 1968).
171

Id at 228.

172

See Cuevas v United States, 317 F3d 751, 753 (7th Cir 2003) (noting that judges

are in the best position to set the ground rules for post-trial interviews sought to support
a claim of juror misconduct).
'7
1991 US Dist LEXIS 6238.
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court offered an administratively efficient means of achieving
this oversight: sending out form letters to former jurors.'74 A
court-issued letter that reiterates to jurors the rights that were
previously enumerated helps ensure that jurors understand their
rights regarding requests for post-trial interviews.
C.

Proposed Consultant Fee

While many former jurors may be willing to consult with attorneys for free upon mistrial,' 7 5 some will require compensation
for their time and thoughts.'7 6 To guard against the concern that
174 Id at *4-5. The form letter that the court in C & C Dairysent to former jurors

appeared as follows:
[Juror Name]
[Address]
[City, State]
Dear:
Now that your federal court service as jurors generally (as well as your specific jury service in the milk antitrust prosecution in my courtroom) has ended,
counsel have asked for the opportunity to confer with you about the case. My understanding is that they believe the opportunity to meet and talk with you may
be of assistance to them in the future, including the government's decision as to
whether or not to proceed with a retrial of defendants Michael Bailey and Michael Stajszczak, Jr.
Let me emphasize a few points:
1.
view.

It is entirely your choice as to whether or not to grant such an inter-

2.
If you are agreeable to an interview, I would suggest that you consider
meeting with both government counsel and defense counsel at the same time. If
you indicate that as your preference to whichever lawyer may call you on the
subject of such an interview, counsel will make the arrangements.
3.
No inference should be drawn from counsel's request or this letter that
your verdict is being brought into question. It is not.
Once again I should like to renew the thanks that I expressed for your service
at the time the verdict was returned.
Sincerely,
Milton I. Shadur
Id.
175 Post, HiringFormerJurors,Natl L J at 6 (cited in note 12) (noting that initially all
but one of the nine former jurors that Cavallo sought to pay as consultants "offered to do
it for free").
176 See, for example, Beach, The Juroras Celebrity,Time at 42 (cited in note 87) (dis-

485]

POST-MISTRIAL JUROR INTER VIEWS

519

the prospect of financial compensation will inform a juror's decisionmaking process, the proposed rule caps this compensation.
Section (4) sets the maximum fee at the per diem that states pay
their citizens for jury service. Although commentators disagree
as to whether this per diem adequately compensates jurors for
their service,177 the consultation fees that lawyers like Cavallo
offer former jurors dwarf this daily payment. 7 ' The best way to
guard against jurors placing a higher value on their time outside
the courtroom than within it is to cap the amount that an attorney can offer a juror for his consultation.
Setting the amount of consultant compensation at the state's
per diem, however, may create confusion. When an attorney offers a former juror the same amount of money for consultant
work as the juror received for her jury duty, the juror may be
confused as to what acceptance of this second fee entails. If the
juror receives the same compensation for her jury and consultation services, she might believe that the law that dictated her
behavior during her jury service still constrains her actions. It is
likely that the informality of a post-trial interview will signal to
the former juror that her obligations to the court system are
complete. Still, in order to mitigate possible confusion, the
instructions in Section (1) of the proposed rule explicitly inform
jurors of their post-trial right to agree or refuse to communicate
with attorneys. As a consequence of this informality and the jury
instructions, the importance of jury duty will remain undiluted
in the minds of former jurors.

cussing the role compensation plays in post-trial interviews between former jurors and
the media). Beach writes:
Jurors sometimes have their own reasons for talking. Money is one. When journalists declined to pay a fee to one [John] Hinckley juror [after the jury decided he was
not guilty by reason of insanity], her husband complained, "Why should she spend
her time so you can make money on her? What's in it for her?"
Id.
177 Lisa Sink, Jurors Issue Ruling on Their Days in Court, Milwaukee J Sentinel 15
(Oct 8, 2000) (detailing a court administrator's description of the per diem jurors receive
as a "token of appreciation").
178 Cavallo himself admitted that the fifty dollars-an-hour that he is offering as a
consultant fee is not the result of a formal assessment of costs to the jurors. Rather, his
justification for paying this rate is that "[i]t seems to be a reasonable amount." Post, Hiring FormerJurors,Natl L J at 6 (cited in note 12).
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D. Proposed Burden to Follow the Rule
Unlike the statutory scheme regulating post-trial contact
with jurors in Connecticut,'79 the burden of adhering to the proposed rule does not rest on the jurors alone. While an attorney in
Connecticut may still face charges of professional misconduct for
violating the statute or face a misdemeanor charge for aiding and
abetting the juror, 8 0 the statute focuses on juror behavior. Instead, the rule that this Comment proposes acts more like the
bill pending in the California State Legislature.'' Like the California bill, the proposed rule ensures that both attorneys and
jurors faithfully adhere to it because it sanctions both equally.
CONCLUSION

Current state statutes, rules of professional conduct, court
rules, and caselaw regarding regulation of post-mistrial communication are insufficient and confusing. This Comment enumerates current state practices regarding post-trial attorney-juror
contact in general. It also examines how these practices fail to
meet the needs of such contact in the particular instance of retrial preparation. From this examination, it seeks to provide an
effective and efficient alternative or supplement to these practices.
Because the use of former jurors as consultants has yet to
become standard procedure for retrial preparation, the proposed
rule might seem premature. Yet, as the attention the press and
public have paid to Cavallo's decision to employ this retrial
strategy
suggests, the time for such a rule is rapidly approach2
8

ing.1

179 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 51-247b.
180 Post, HiringFormerJurors,Natl

L J at 6 (cited in note 12).
'8' Bill 252, Cal State Senate (Feb 15, 2005).
182 See, for example, Curtis, Paying Jurors,Cal Bar J (cited in note 2) (detailing the
current debate among lawyers and academics regarding the costs and benefits of
Cavallo's retrial strategy); Graham, Flap Ensues Over HiringEx-Jurors, Christian Sci
Monitor at 17 (cited in note 146) (same); Srisavasdi, DA Opposes Paying Ex-Jurors to
Consult Orange County Register at 1 (cited in note 59) (detailing the current push by
California prosecutors and law makers to prohibit attorneys from paying jurors as consultants through adoption of the Jury Integrity Act); So Cal Lawyer, The Southern California Law Biog: Comment on Former Haidi Jurors to be Hired as Consultants for ReTial, available at <http://socallawblog.com/2004/07/19/former-haidl-jurors-to-be-hired-asconsultants-for-re-trial> (last visited Apr 24, 2005) (informally detailing an individual's
outrage with Cavallo's retrial strategy).
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APPENDIX 1.
SURVEY OF DISTRICT COURT RULES GOVERNING POST-TRIAL
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ATTORNEYS AND JURORS.

STATE
Alabama

RUIL(S)"
M D Ala Ct Rule 47.1.
Attorneys, parties, or anyone acting for them or on their behalf
shall not, without filing a formal motion therefore with the court
and securing the court's permission, interrogate jurors in Civil or
Criminal cases, either in person or in writing, in an attempt to
determine the basis for any verdict rendered or to secure other
information concerning the deliberations of the jury or any members thereof.
N D Ala Ct Rule 47.1.
Communications with a juror concerning a case on which such
person has served as a juror or alternate juror shall not, without
prior express approval of a judge of this court, be initiated by any
attorney, party, or representative of either, prior to the day following such person's release from jury service for such term of court.
S D Ala Ct Rule 47.2.

Alaska

Attorneys, parties or anyone acting for them or on their behalf
shall not, without filing a formal petition therefore with the court
and securing the court's permission, interrogate jurors, or alternate
jurors, either in person or in writing, relative to actions in which
they have served.
D Alaska Ct Rule 83.1(h).
(1) No attorney admitted to practice or appear before this court
may [A] seek out, contact, or interview at any time any juror of the
jury venire of this court; or [B] without prior approval of the court,
allow, cause, permit, authorize or in any way participate in any
contact or interview with any juror relating to any case in which
the attorney has entered an appearance.
(2) This subsection will be posted in the jury rooms of this District
I and jurors will be instructed fully as to this matter.

- "N/A" denotes that the author found no applicable court rule. All rules are current
as of March 2004.
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STATE
Arizona

RULE(S)
D Ariz R Ct Rule 1.11(b).

Arkansas

Interviews with jurors after trial by or on behalf of parties involved
in the trial are prohibited except on condition that the attorney or
party involved desiring such an interview file with the Court written interrogatories proposed to be submitted to the juror(s), together with an affidavit setting forth the reasons for such proposed
interrogatories, within the time granted for a motion for a new
trial. Approval for the interview of jurors in accordance with the
interrogatories and affidavit so filed will be granted only upon the
showing of good cause. See Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 606(b).
Following the interview, a second affidavit must be filed indicating
the scope and results of the interviews with jurors and setting out
the answers given to the interrogatories.
E D Ark Ct Rule 47.1.
No juror shall be contacted without express permission of the
Court and under such conditions as the Court may prescribe.
W D Ark Ct Rule 47.1.

California

Colorado

Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia

No juror shall be contacted without express permission of the
Court and under such conditions as the Court may prescribe.
C D Cal
N/A
E D Cal
N/A
NDCal
N/A
S D Cal
N/A
D Colo Ct Rule 24.1.
No party or attorney shall communicate with, or cause another to
communicate with, a juror or prospective juror before, during or
after any trial without written authority signed by the judicial
officer to whom the case is assigned for trial.
D Conn
N/A
D Del
N/A
D DC Crim Ct Rule 24.2(b).
After a verdict is rendered or a mistrial is declared but before the
jury is discharged, an attorney or party may request leave of Court
to speak with members of the jury before their discharge. Upon
receiving such a request, the Court shall inform the jury that no
juror is required to speak to anyone but that a juror may do so if
the juror wishes. If no request to speak with jurors is made before
discharge of the jury, no party or attorney shall speak with a juror
concerning the case except when permitted by the Court for good
cause shown in writing. The Court may grant permission to speak
with a juror upon such conditions as it deems appropriate, including but not limited to a requirement that the juror be examined
I only in the presence of the Court.
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RULE(S)
M D Fla Ct Rule 5.01(d).
No attorney or party shall undertake, directly or indirectly, to
interview any juror after trial in any Civil or Criminal case except
as permitted by this Rule. If a party believes that grounds for legal
challenge exist, he may move for an order permitting an interview
of a juror or jurors to determine whether the verdict is subject to
the challenge.... If the interview is permitted, the Court may
prescribe the place, manner, conditions and scope of the interview.
N D Fla
N/A
S D Fla Ct Rule 11.1(E).
Before, during, and after the trial, a lawyer should avoid conversing or otherwise communicating with a juror on any subject,
whether pertaining to the case or not. Provided, however, after the
jury has been discharged, upon application in writing and for good
cause shown, the Court may allow counsel to interview jurors to
determine whether their verdict is subject to legal challenge. In
this event, the Court shall enter an order limiting the time, place,
and circumstances under which the interviews shall be conducted.
The scope of the interviews should be restricted and caution should
be used to avoid embarrassment to any juror and to avoid influencing the juror's action in any subsequent jury services.

Georgia

M D Ga
N/A
ND Ga
N/A
S D Ga Ct Rule 83.8.
No party, attorney, or other person shall, without Court approval,
make or attempt any communication relating to any feature of the
trial of any case with any regular or alternate juror who has served
in such case, whether or not the case was concluded by verdict.

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois

D Haw
N/A
D Idaho
N/A
C D Ill Ct Rule 47.2(2).
No attorney, party, or representative of either may interrogate a
juror after the verdict has been returned without prior court approval of the presidingjudge. Approval of the presiding judge shall
be sought only by application made by counsel orally in open court
or upon written motion which states the grounds and purpose of
the interrogation. If a post-verdict interrogation of one or more of
the members of the jury should be approved, the scope of the interrogation and other appropriate limitations upon the interrogation
will be determined by the presiding judge prior to the interrogaI tion.
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RULE(S)
N D Ill Ct Rule 83.53.5(d).
After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case in
the United States District or Bankruptcy Courts of this District
with which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask
questions of or make comments to a juror without first obtaining
leave of court, nor shall the lawyer thereafter ask questions of or
make comments to a member of the venire that are calculated to
harass or embarrass the juror or to influence such juror's actions in
future jury service.
S D Ill Ct Rule 53.

Indiana

No attorney, party, or representative of either may interrogate a
juror after the verdict has been returned without prior approval of
the presiding judge. Approval of the presiding judge shall be
sought only by application made by counsel orally in open court or
upon written motion which states the grounds and purpose of the
interrogation. If a post-verdict interrogation of one or more of the
members of the jury should be approved, the scope of the interrogation and other appropriate limitations upon the interrogation will
be determined by the presiding judge prior to the interrogation.
N D Ind Ct Rule 47.2.
No attorney or party appearing in this court, or any of their agents
or employees, shall approach, interview, or communicate with any
member of the jury except on leave of court granted upon notice to
opposing counsel and upon good cause shown. This rule applies to
any communication before trial members of the venire from which
the jury will be selected, as well as any communication with members of the jury during trial, during deliberations, or after return of
a verdict. Any juror contact permitted by the court shall be subject
to the control of the judge.
S D Ind Ct Rule 47.2.

Iowa

No attorneys (or pro se litigants) appearing in this Court, or any of
their agents or employees, shall approach, interview, or communicate any member of the jury following a trial except on leave of
Court granted upon notice to opposing counsel. In all criminal
cases, any petition for leave of Court to make such contact or communication shall require showing of good cause.
N D Iowa Ct Rule 47.1.
Except by leave of court, no party or attorney, and no other person
acting on their behalf may contact, interview, examine or question
any trial juror or potential trial juror before, during, or after a trial
concerning the juror's actual or potential jury service.
S D Iowa Ct Rule 47.1.
Except by leave of court, no party or attorney, and no other person
acting on their behalf may contact, interview, examine or question
any trial juror or potential trial juror before, during, or after a trial
concerning the juror's actual or potential jury service.
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STATE
Kansas

RULE(S)
D Kan Court Rule 47.1.

Kentucky

(a) No juror has any obligation to speak to any person about any
case and may refuse all interviews or comments. No person may
make repeated requests for interviews or comments after a juror
has expressed his or her desire not to be interviewed or questioned.
(b) Under no circumstances except by order of the court in its
discretion, and other such terms and conditions as it shall
establish, shall any party or any party's attorney or their agents or
employees examine or interview any juror, either orally or in
writing, nor shall any juror consenting to be interviewed disclose
any information with respect to the specific vote of any juror other
than the juror being interviewed, or the deliberations of the jury.
(c) At the time that a jury is discharged from further consideration
of a case upon the return of a verdict, the declaration of a mistrial
or otherwise, and when jurors (including alternates) are excused
after commencement of a trial, the court shall advise all jurors so
discharged or excused of the provisions of this rule.
E D Ky Ct Rule 47.1.
Unless permitted by the Court, no party or attorney-or the representative of a party or attorney-may contact, interview, or communicate with any juror before, during, or after trial.
W D Ky Ct Rule 47.1.

Louisiana

Unless permitted by the Court, no party or attorney-or the representative of a party or attorney-may contact, interview, or communicate with any juror before, during, or after trial.
E D La Ct Rule 47.5E.
(A) No juror has any obligation to speak to any person about any
case and may refuse all interviews or comments
(B) No person may make repeated requests for interviews or questions after a juror has expressed a desire not to be interviewed
(C) Under no circumstances except by leave of court granted upon
good cause shown shall any attorney or party to an action or anyone acting on their behalf examine or interview any juror. No juror
who may consent to be interviewed shall disclose any information
with respect to the following: (1) The specific vote of the juror being
interviewed; (2) The deliberations of the jury; or (3) For the purposes of obtaining evidence of improprieties in the jury's deliberations.
M D La Ct Rule 47.5E.
(A) No juror has any obligation to speak to any person about any
case and may refuse all interviews or comments
(B) No person may make repeated requests for interviews or questions after a juror has expressed a desire not to be interviewed
(C) Under no circumstances except by leave of court granted upon
good cause shown shall any attorney or party to an action or anyone acting on their behalf examine or interview any juror. No juror
who may consent to be interviewed shall disclose any information
with respect to the following: (1) The specific vote of the juror being
interviewed; (2) The deliberations of the jury; or (3) For the purposes of obtaining evidence of improprieties in the jury's deliberations.
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RUL()

W D La Ct Rule 47.5E.

Maine
Maryland

(A) No juror has any obligation to speak to any person about any
case and may refuse all interviews or comments
(B) No person may make repeated requests for interviews or questions after a juror has expressed a desire not to be interviewed
(C) Under no circumstances except by leave of court granted upon
good cause shown shall any attorney or party to an action or anyone acting on their behalf examine or interview any juror. No juror
who may consent to be interviewed shall disclose any information
with respect to the following: (1) The specific vote of the juror being
interviewed; (2) The deliberations of the jury; or (3) For the purposes of obtaining evidence of improprieties in the jury's deliberations.
D Me
N/A
D Md Civ Ct Rule 107(16).

Minnesota

Unless permitted by the presiding judge, no attorney or party shall
directly or through an agent interview or question any juror, alternate juror or prospective juror with respect to that juror's jury
service.
D Mass
N/A
E D Mich
N/A
W D Mich
N/A
D Minn Ct Rule 42.7.

Mississippi

Except by leave of Court, no party, or any investigator, attorney, or
other person acting for a party, shall interview, examine, or question any grand or trial juror while such juror is still subject to call
or recall during the juror's term of service. Nothing in this rule
prohibits federal law enforcement authorities from contacting
jurors in extraordinary circumstances without Court approval
pursuant to a jury tampering or related investigation. In such
extraordinary circumstance, the government shall notify the Court
as soon as possible.
N D Miss Ct Rule 83. 1(B)(4).

Massachusetts
Michigan

Upon the return of a verdict by the jury in any Civil or Criminal
action, neither the attorneys in the action nor the parties may, in
the courtroom or elsewhere, express to the members of the jury
their pleasure or displeasure with the verdict. After the jury has
been discharged, neither the attorneys in the action nor the parties
shall at any time or in any manner communicate with the jury or
any member thereof regarding the verdict. Provided, however, that
if any attorney believes in good faith that the verdict may be subject to legal challenge, the attorney may apply ex parte to the trial
judge for permission to interview one or more members of the jury
regarding any fact or circumstance claimed to support the legal
challenge. If satisfied that good cause exists, the judge may grant
permission for the attorney to make the requested communication
and shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which the same
may be conducted.
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RULE(S)
S D Miss Ct Rule 83. 1(B)(4).

Missouri

Upon the return of a verdict by the jury in any Civil or Criminal
action, neither the attorneys in the action nor the parties may, in
the courtroom or elsewhere, express to the members of the jury
their pleasure or displeasure with the verdict. After the jury has
been discharged, neither the attorneys in the action nor the parties
shall at any time or in any manner communicate with the jury or
any member thereof regarding the verdict. Provided, however, that
if any attorney believes in good faith that the verdict may be subject to legal challenge, the attorney may apply ex parte to the trial
judge for permission to interview one or more members of the jury
regarding any fact or circumstance claimed to support the legal
challenge. If satisfied that good cause exists, the judge may grant
permission for the attorney to make the requested communication
and shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which the same
may be conducted.
E D Mo Ct Rule 47-7.01(B)(1).

Montana

Petit jurors shall not be required to provide any information concerning any action of the petit jury, unless ordered to do so by the
Court. Attorneys and parties to an action shall not, directly or
indirectly, communicate with any petit juror, relative, friend or
associate thereof at any time concerning the action, except with
leave of Court. If an attorney or party receives evidence of misconduct by a petit juror, the attorney or party shall inform the Court
and the Court may conduct an investigation to establish the accuracy of the misconduct allegations.
WD Mo
N/A
D Mont Ct Rule 48.2(b).

Nevada

Interviews with jurors after trial by or on behalf of parties involved
in the trial are prohibited, unless the attorney or party involved
desiring such an interview files proposed written interrogatories
with the Court, together with an affidavit setting for the reasons
for such proposed interrogatories, within the time granted for a
motion for a new trial. Approval of the interview of jurors in accordance with the interrogatories and affidavit so filed will be granted
only upon the showing of good cause. See Federal Rules of Evidence 606(b). Following the interview, a second affidavit must be
filed indicating the scope and results of the interviews with jurors
and setting out the answers given to the interrogatories.
D Neb
N/A
D Nev Ct Rule 48-1.

New Hampshire

Unless otherwise permitted by the court, no party, attorney or
other interested person shall communicate with or contact any
juror until the jury concludes its deliberations and is discharged.
D NH Ct Rule 47.3.

Nebraska

No attorney, party, or witness, acting directly or through the use of
an agent, shall attempt to communicate with any juror, prospective
juror, or former juror concerning the person's service as a juror
without obtaining prior approval of the court. The court will not
approve a request to communicate with ajuror except in extraordinary circumstances and for good cause shown.
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RULE(S)
D NJ Civ Ct Rule 47.1(e).
No attorney or party to an action shall personally or through an
investigator or other person acting for such attorney or party,
directly or indirectly interview, examine or question any juror,
relative, friend or associate thereof during the pendency of the trial
or with respect to the deliberations or verdict of the jury in any
action, except on leave of Court granted upon good cause shown.
D NM
N/A
E D NY
N/A
N D NY Ct Rule 47.5(1).
At any time after the Court has called a jury panel from which
jurors shall be selected to try cases for a term of Court fixed by the
presiding judge or otherwise impaneled, no party or attorney, or
anyone associated with the party or the attorney, shall have any
communication or contact by any means or manner with any juror
until such time as the panel of jurors has been excused and the
term of court ended.
SDNY
N/A
WDNY
N/A
E D NC Crim Ct Rule 24.2(c).
Following the discharge of a jury from further consideration of a
case, no attorney or party litigant shall individually or through an
investigator or any person acting for such attorney or party litigant
ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury or the
members of the family of such a juror that are calculated merely to
harass or embarrass the such a juror or member of such juror's
family or to influence the actions of such a juror or a member of
such juror's family in future jury service.
M D NC Ct Rule 47.1(b).
(1) All parties, witnesses, and attorneys shall avoid any extrajudicial contact or communication with a grand juror or member of
a petit jury venire or panel who has been or may be selected in a
case in which that person is involved. No person may have any
extra-judicial contact or communication, either directly or indirectly, with a grand juror or a member of a petit jury venire or
panel which may reasonably have the effect of influencing, or
which is intended to influence, the grand juror, potential petit juror
or sitting petit juror.
(4) No provision of this rule is intended to prohibit communication
with a petit juror after the juror has been dismissed from further
service, so long as the communication does not tend to harass,
humiliate or intimidate the juror in any fashion.
W D NC Ct Rule 47.2.
No attorney or party to an action shall personally or through their
designees, directly or indirectly, interview, examine or question
any juror, relative, friend or associate thereof during the pendency
of the trial or with respect to the deliberations or verdict of the jury
in any action, except on leave of the presiding judge upon good
cause shown.
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RULE(S)
D ND
N/A
N D Ohio
N/A
S D Ohio Civ Ct Rule 47.1.
No attorney, party, or anyone acting as an agent or in concert with
them connected with the trial of an action shall personally, or
acting though an investigator or other person interview, examine
or question any juror with respect to the verdict or deliberations of
the jury in the action except with leave of the Court.
E D Ok Ct Rule 47.2.
No person shall communicate with any juror concerning the juror's
service in any trial prior to the juror's discharge from the case.
Upon discharge from service, each juror is free to discuss or refuse
to discuss that juror's service with any person, if the juror so desires. Attorneys who are officers of this Court, and those acting on
behalf of such attorneys, are prohibited from approaching jurors in
any manner at any time concerning a juror's service, except upon
leave of the Court after a showing of good cause.
N D Ok Ct Rule 47.2.
No person shall communicate with any juror concerning said juror's services in any trial prior to the juror's discharge from the
case. Upon discharge from service, each juror is free to discuss, or
refuse to discuss, said juror's service with any person if the juror so
desires. Attorneys who are officers of this court and those acting on
behalf of such attorneys are prohibited from approaching jurors in
any matter at any time concerning said juror's service, except on
leave of court upon a showing of good cause.
W D Ok Civ Ct Rule 47.1.

Oregon

At no time, including after a case has been completed, may attorneys approach or speak to jurors regarding the case unless authorized by the Court, upon written application.
D Or Ct Rule 48.4.
Notwithstanding DR 7-108(D),'" after the verdict an attorney may
not initiate contact with jurors except as authorized by the court.

Pennsylvania

E D Pa Crim Ct Rule 24.1(c).
After the conclusion of a trial no attorney, party or witness shall
communicate with or cause another to communicate with any
member of the jury without first receiving permission of the court.
M D Pa Ct Rule 83.2.8.
No Attorney or party or anyone acting on behalf of such attorney or
party shall, without express permission from the court, initiate any
communication with any juror pertaining to any case in which that
juror may be drawn,, is participating or has participated.
WD Pa
N/A

183

See Appendix 2.
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RULE(S)
D RI Ct Rule 15(g)(2).

South Dakota

After a verdict is rendered but before the jury is discharged from
the case, counsel may request leave of the Court to converse with
members of the jury. Upon receiving such a request, the Court will
inform the jury that no juror has any obligation to speak with
counsel or parties but that any juror may do so if he wishes.
D SC
N/A
D SD Ct Rule 47.2.

Tennessee

None of the parties or their lawyers or anybody acting on their
behalf shall contact jurors after a trial until the jurors have completed their term of service as jurors. The Court may order exceptions to this rule in various instances, but not limited to the instance of a hung jury.
E D Tenn Ct Rule 48.1.

South Carolina

No attorney, party, or representative of either may interrogate a
juror after a verdict has been returned or the trial has been otherwise concluded, without prior permission of the court.
M D Tenn Ct Rule 12(h).
No attorney, party, or representative of either may interrogate a
juror after the verdict has been returned without prior approval of
the court. Approval of the Court shall be sought only by an application made by counsel orally in open court, or upon written motion
which states the grounds and the purpose of the interrogation. If a
post-verdict interrogation of one or more members of the jury
should be approved, the scope of the interrogation and other limitations upon the interrogation will be determined by the Judge prior
to the interrogation.
W D Tenn 47.1(b)(2).

Texas

In the event that a mistrial is ordered due to the jurors' inability to
agree on a verdict, any attorney or the attorney's representative
may interrogate a juror without prior approval of the court, unless
the court determines that the interrogation should not take place
or determines that appropriate limitations should be established.
E D Tex Crim Ct Rule 24(b).
(2) After a verdict is rendered but before the jury is discharged
from further duty, an attorney may obtain leave of the judge before
whom the action was tried to converse with members of the jury.
(3) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of the
judge before whom an action is being or has been tried to permit
conversations between jurors and attorneys.
N D Tex Crim Ct Rule 24.1.
A party, attorney, or representative of a party or attorney, shall
not, before or after trial, contact any juror, unless explicitly permitted to do so by the presiding judge.
S D Tex Crim Ct Rule 24.1.
Except with leave of Court, no attorney, party, nor agent of either
of them may communicate with a former juror to obtain evidence of
misconduct in the jury's deliberations.
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RULE(S)
W D Tex
N/A
D Utah Civ Ct Rule 47-2(b).
The court will instruct jurors that they are under no obligation to
discuss their deliberations or verdict with anyone, although they
are free to do so if they wish. The court may set special conditions
or restrictions upon juror interviews or may forbid such interviews.
D Vt
N/A
E D Va Crim Ct Rule 24(C).
No attorney or party litigant shall personally, or through any investigator or any other person acting for the attorney or party
litigant interview, examine, or question any juror or alternate juror
with respect to the verdict or deliberations of the jury in any Crim
action except on leave of Court granted upon good cause shown and
upon such conditions as the Court shall fix.
WD Va
N/A
E D Wash
N/A
W D Wash
N/A
N D W Va
N/A
S D W Va Ct Rule 3.04.
After the conclusion of a trial, no party, nor his or her agent or
attorney, shall communicate or attempt to communicate with any
member of the jury about the jury's deliberations or verdict without
first applying for (with notice to all other parties) and obtaining for
good cause an order allowing such communication.
E D Wis Ct Rule 47.3.
This rule applies to any communication before trial with members
of the venire from which the jury will be selected, as well as any
communication with members of the jury during trial, deliberations, and after the return of a verdict. No attorneys appearing in
any branch of this Court, or any of their agents or employees, shall
approach, interview or communicate with any member of the jury
except on leave of Court granted upon notice to opposing counsel
and upon good cause shown. Good cause includes a trial attorney's
request for permission to contact one or more jurors after trial for
the trial attorney's educational benefit. The juror(s) must be advised at the outset of any communication that his or her participation is voluntary. Any juror contact permitted by the Court under
this rule must be subject to the control of the Court.
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RULE(S)
D Wyo Crim Ct Rule 24.1.
(b) No juror has any obligation to speak to any person about any
case and may refuse all interviews and comments. No person may
make repeated requests for interviews or comments after a juror
has expressed a desire not to be interviewed or questioned. If any
person violates this prohibition against repeated requests of a juror
for interviews or comments after the juror's refusal, the juror or
jurors involved shall promptly advise the Court of the facts and
circumstances. The Court shall take such action as it deems appropriate, which may include a contempt citation to the offending
party or parties.
(c) If any juror consents to be interviewed after trial, under no
circumstances shall such juror disclose or be asked to disclose any
information with respect to the specific vote of any juror, other
than the juror being interviewed or with respect to the deliberations of the jury.
(d) Following the rendition of a verdict by a jury, counsel in the
case shall not thank the jury for their verdict.
(e) At the time that a jury is discharged from further consideration
of a case upon return of a verdict or the declaration of a mistrial or
otherwise, and when jurors are excused or discharged after commencement of a trial the Court shall advise all jurors so discharged
or excused of this rule.
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APPENDIX 2.
SURVEY OF STATE BAR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

GOVERNING POST-TRIAL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ATTORNEYS
AND JURORS.

STATE
Alabama

RULE(S)'*"
Ala Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Alaska

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
Alaska Prof Conduct Rule 3.10.

Arizona

After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case
with which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask
questions of or make comments to a member of that jury that
are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to
influence the juror's actions in future jury service.
Ariz Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Arkansas

A lawyer shall not (c) communicate with a juror or prospective
juror after discharge of the jury if- (1) the communication is
prohibited by law or court order; (2) the juror has made known
to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.
Ark Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

California

A lawyer shall not: (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror, or other official] on the merits of the
cause except as permitted by law.
Cal Prof Conduct Rule 5-320.

Colorado

(D) After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a
case a member shall not ask questions of or make comments to
a member of that jury that are intended to harass or embarrass
the juror or to influence the juror's actions in future jury service.
(F) All restrictions imposed by this rule also apply to communications with, or investigations of, members of the family of a
person who is either a member of the venire or a juror.
Colo Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.
A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.

"N/A" denotes that the author found no applicable state bar rule of professional
'**
conduct.
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STATE
Connecticut

RULE(S)
Conn Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Delaware

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
Del Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

District of Columbia

A lawyer shall not (c) communicate with a juror or prospective
juror after discharge of the jury unless the communication is
permitted by court rule.
DC Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Florida

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
Fla Prof Conduct Rule 4-3.5(d).

Georgia

A lawyer shall not (4) after dismissal of the jury in a case with
which the lawyer is connected, initiate communication with or
cause another to initiate communication with any juror regarding the trial except to determine whether the verdict may be
subject to legal challenge; provided, a lawyer may not interview
jurors for this purpose unless the lawyer has reason to believe
that grounds for such challenge may exist; and provided further, before conducting any such interview the lawyer must file
in the cause a notice of intention to interview setting forth the
name of the juror or jurors to be interviewed. A copy of the
notice must be delivered to the trial judge and opposing counsel
a reasonable time before such interview. The provisions of this
rule to do not prohibit a lawyer from communicating with
members of the venire or jurors in the course of official proceedings or as authorized by court rule or written order of the court.
Ga Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.
A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: (b) communicate ex parte with [a
judge, juror, prospective juror or other official] except as perI mitted by law.
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RULE(S)
Haw Prof Conduct Rule 3.5(e)(4).

Idaho

A lawyer shall not: after dismissal of the jury in a case with
which the lawyer is connected, communicate with a juror regarding the trial except that:
(i) upon leave of he court, which leave shall be freely granted, a
lawyer may ask questions of, or respond to questions from,
jurors about the trial, provided that the lawyer does so in a
manner that is not calculated to harass or embarrass any juror
and does not seek to influence the juror's actions in future jury
service in any particular case; and (ii) upon leave of court for
good cause shown, a lawyer who believes there are grounds for
legal challenge to a verdict may conduct an in-court examination of jurors or former jurors to determine whether the verdict
is subject to challenge. A motion for in-court examination of
discharged jurors under this subsection
(ii) shall be served no later than ten (10) days after the judgment has been entered unless good cause is shown for the failure to serve the motion within that time. If the examination is
permitted, the court shall prescribe the time, manner, place and
scope of the investigation.
Idaho Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Illinois

A lawyer shall not (c) communicate with a juror or prospective
juror after discharge of the jury if: (1) the communication is
prohibited by law or court order; (2) the juror has made known
to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.
Ill Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Indiana

(d) After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a
case with which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not
ask questions of or make comments to a juror until the venire of
which such juror is a member has been discharged, nor shall
the lawyer thereafter ask questions of or make comments to a
member of the venire that are calculated merely to harass or
embarrass the juror or to influence such juror's actions in future jury service.
(f) All restrictions imposed by Rule 3.5 also apply to communications with or investigations of the families of members of the
venire or jury.
Ind Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.
A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
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Iowa

RUIJ A)
Iowa Prof Conduct Rule 7-29.

Kansas

To safeguard the impartiality that is essential to the judicial
process, venirepersons and jurors should be protected against
extraneous influences .... After the trial, communication by a
lawyer with jurors is permitted so long as the lawyer refrains
from asking questions or making comments that tend to harass
or embarrass the juror or to influence actions of the juror in
future cases. Were a lawyer to be prohibited from communicating after trial with a juror, the lawyer could not ascertain if the
verdict might be subject to legal challenge, in which even the
invalidity of a verdict might go undetected. When an extrajudical communication by a lawyer with a juror is permitted by law,
it should be made considerately and with deference to the personal feelings of the juror.
Kan Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Kentucky

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate or cause another to communicate with a member of a jury or the venire from which the
jury will be selected about the matters under consideration
other than in the course of official proceedings until after the
discharge of the jury from further consideration of the case.
Ky Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Louisiana

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with a [judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] as to the merits of the
cause except as permitted by law.
La Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Maine

A lawyer shall not: (c) communicate with a juror or prospective
juror after discharge of the jury if: (1) the communication is
prohibited by law or court order; (2) the juror has made known
to the lawyer the desire not to communicate; or (3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.
Me Prof Conduct Rule 3.7(f)(2).

Maryland
Massachusetts

After discharge of a juror from further jury service, a lawyer
may ask or answer questions and make comments to the former
juror provided the questions or comments are not intended to
harass or embarrass the juror or influence the juror's action in
future jury service.
N/A
Mass Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Sl 'TE

A lawyer shall not: (d) after discharge of the jury from further
consideration of a case with which the lawyer was connected,
initiate any communication with a member of the jury without
leave of court granted for good cause shown. If a juror initiates
a communication with such a lawyer, directly or indirectly, the
lawyer may respond provided that the lawyer shall not ask
questions of or make comments to a member of that jury that
are intended only to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his or her actions in future jury service. In no circumstances shall such a lawyer inquire of a juror concerning the
I jury's deliberation process.
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STATE
Michigan

RULE(S)
Mich Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Minnesota

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
Minn Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.
(c) After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a
case with which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not
ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury
that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or
to influence the juror's actions in future jury service.
(d) A lawyer shall not conduct or cause another, by financial
support or otherwise, to conduct a vexatious or harassing investigation of a juror or prospective juror.
(e) All restrictions imposed by this rule apply also to communications with or investigations of members of a family of a juror
or prospective juror.

Mississippi

Miss Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.
A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.

Missouri

Mo Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Montana

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
Mont Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Nebraska
Nevada

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
N/A
Nev Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

New Hampshire

A lawyer shall not (2) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
NH Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

New Jersey

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
NJ Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

New Mexico

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
NM Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.
A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by

I

law.

New York

N/A
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RULE(S)
NC Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

(a) A lawyer shall not (2) communicate ex parte with a juror or
a prospective juror except as permitted by law.
(b) All restrictions imposed by this rule also apply to communications with, or investigations of members of the family of a
juror or a prospective juror.
Comment 3. After the jury has been discharged, a lawyer may
communicate with a juror unless the communication is prohibited by law or court order. The lawyer must refrain from asking
questions or making comments that tend to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence actions of the juror in future cases,
and must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the
lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during
the communication.
N/A
N/A
Ok Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Oregon

A lawyer shall not (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other decision maker except as permitted by law or
the rules of a tribunal; (c) communicate directly or through
another with a juror or prospective juror except as permitted by
law or the rules of court.
Or Prof Conduct Rule 7-108(D).

Pennsylvania

After discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case
with which the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask
questions or make comments to a member of that jury that are
calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence the juror's actions in future jury service.
Pa Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Rhode Island

A lawyer shall not (c) communicate with a juror or prospective
juror after discharge of the jury if. (1) the communication is
prohibited by law or court order; (2) the juror has made known
to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.
RI Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

South Carolina

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
SC Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

South Dakota

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
SD Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.
A lawyer shall not (c) communicate with a juror or prospective
juror after the discharge of the jury if (1) the communication is
prohibited by law or court order; (2) the juror has made known
to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.
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STATE
Tennessee

RULE(S)
Tenn Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Texas
Utah
Vermont

A lawyer shall not (c) communicate with a juror after completion of the juror's term of service if the communication is prohibited by law, or is calculated merely to harass or embarrass
the juror or to influence the juror's actions in future jury service.
N/A
N/A
Vt Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Virginia

A lawyer shall not (b) communicated ex parte (2) with a juror or
prospective juror during the juror's term of service, except as
ermitted by law.
Va Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Washington

A lawyer shall not (2) after discharge of the jury from further
consideration of a case (i) ask questions of or make comments to
a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or
embarrass the juror or to influence the juror's actions in future
jury service; (ii) communicate with a member of that jury if the
communication is prohibited by law or court order; or (iii) communicate with a member of that jury if the juror has made
known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) conduct
or cause, by financial support or otherwise, another to conduct a
vexatious or harassing investigation of either a juror or a member of a venire.
Wash Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

West Virginia

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
W Va Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Wisconsin

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law.
Wis Prof Conduct Rule 3.5.

Wyoming

A lawyer shall not (b) communicate ex parte with [a judge,
juror, prospective juror or other official] except as permitted by
law or for scheduling purposes permitted by the court.
N/A
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